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Abstract
We study the effect of government assistance on bank risk taking. Using hand-collected data on bank applications 
for government assistance under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), we investigate the effect of both 
application approvals and denials. To distinguish banks’ risk taking behavior from changes in economic 
conditions, we control for the volume and quality of credit demand based on micro-level data on home mortgages 
and corporate loans. Our difference-in-difference analysis indicates that banks make riskier loans and shift 
investment portfolios toward riskier securities after being approved for government assistance. However, this shift 
in risk occurs mostly within the same asset class and, therefore, remains undetected by the closely-monitored 
capitalization levels, which indicate an improved capital position at approved banks. Consequently, these banks 
appear safer according to regulatory ratios, but show a significant increase in volatility and default risk. 
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1. Introduction 
The financial crisis of 2008-2009 resulted in an unprecedented liquidity shock to financial institutions in the U.S. 
(Gorton and Metrick, 2012) and abroad (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). To stabilize the banking system, governments 
around the world initiated a wave of capital assistance to financial firms. Many economists and regulators argue 
that this wave altered the perception of government protection of banks (Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein, 2008) and 
created a precedent that will have a profound effect on the future behavior of financial institutions. At the 
forefront of this debate is the effect of the bailout on bank risk taking (Flannery 2010), since risk taking, coupled 
with inadequate regulation (Levine 2012), is often blamed for leading to the crisis in the first place. This debate 
has broad policy implications, since the relation between government intervention and bank risk taking is at the 
core of financial system design (Song and Thakor, 2011). This paper studies whether and how the recent bailout 
affected risk taking in credit origination and investment activities of U.S. financial institutions. 
Our empirical analysis focuses on the financial crisis of 2008-2009, thus exploiting an economy-wide 
liquidity shock, which simultaneously affected an unusually large cross-section of firms and resulted in the largest 
bailout in corporate history. In particular, we study the effect of the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), which 
invested $205 billion in U.S. financial institutions, becoming the first and largest initiative of the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP). Using a hand-collected dataset on the status of bank applications for federal assistance, 
we are able to observe both banks’ decisions to apply for bailout funds and regulators’ decisions to grant 
assistance to specific institutions. This research setting allows us to control for the selection of bailed firms and to 
study the risk taking implications of both bailout approvals and bailout denials. Our risk analysis spans three 
channels of bank operations: (1) retail lending (mortgages), (2) corporate lending (large syndicated loans), and (3) 
investment activities (financial assets).   
Our empirical analysis begins with the retail lending market. Our data allow us to observe bank lending 
decisions on nearly all mortgage applications submitted in the United States in 2006-2010 and to account for key 
loan characteristics, such as borrower income and demographics, loan amount, and property location. This 
empirical design enables us to address a critical identification issue – to distinguish the supply-side changes in 
bank credit origination from the demand-side changes in the volume and quality of potential borrowers.  
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1925710
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In difference-in-difference tests, we do not find a significant change in the volume of credit origination by 
banks that were approved for federal assistance, as compared to banks with similar financial characteristics that 
were denied federal aid. We also do not detect a significant change in the distribution of borrowers between 
approved and denied banks. Our main finding is that after being approved for federal assistance, banks shifted 
their credit origination toward riskier mortgages. For example, relative to banks that were denied federal 
assistance, approved banks increased their origination rates on mortgage applications with above-median loan-to-
income ratios by 4.9 percentage points. As a result, the fraction of higher-risk mortgages in the originated credit 
increased for approved banks, but declined for their unapproved counterparts.
Our findings are qualitatively similar for large corporate loans. Our tests focus on the variation in the 
share of credit originated by CPP participants at the level of each syndicated loan. In difference-in-difference 
analysis of banks granted and denied government assistance, we document a robust shift by banks approved for 
CPP toward originating higher-yield, riskier loans. After being approved for federal assistance, banks increase 
their share of credit issuance to riskier corporate borrowers, as measured by borrowers’ cash flow volatility, 
interest coverage, and asset tangibility, and reduce their share of credit issuance to safer firms. Altogether, our 
findings for both retail and corporate loans suggest that the bailout was associated with a shift in credit rationing 
rather than an expansion in the volume of credit, leading to a marked increase in the riskiness of originated credit 
by banks approved for government support relative to unapproved banks. In particular, using interest yields as a 
measure of credit risk, we find that after the bailout, the average loan yield at approved banks increased by 23.1% 
relative to unapproved banks with similar characteristics.  
We find a similar increase in risk taking by approved banks in their investment activities. After being 
approved for federal assistance, banks significantly increased their investments in risky securities such as non-
agency mortgage-backed securities and reduced their allocations to low-risk securities such as Treasury bonds. 
For the average bank approved for federal assistance, the total weight of investment securities in bank assets 
increased by 8.7% after CPP relative to unapproved banks. Within these portfolio investments, approved banks 
increased their allocations to risky securities by 6.8%, while, at the same time, reducing their investments in 
lower-risk securities by 11.2% relative to unapproved banks. This shift in portfolio assets toward risky securities 
is reliably significant relative to unapproved banks and holds after controlling for bank fundamentals. 
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Overall, our analysis at the micro-level indicates a robust increase in risk taking in both lending and 
investment activities by banks approved for government assistance, as compared to fundamentally similar banks, 
which were denied federal assistance. After identifying the sources of the shift in risk taking at the micro-level, 
we present aggregate evidence on the perceived risk of approved and unapproved financial institutions. We find 
that federal capital infusions significantly improved capitalization levels of approved banks, with their average 
capital-to-assets ratio increasing by 13.6% relative to unapproved banks. However, the reduction in leverage was 
more than offset by an increase in the riskiness of the asset mix of approved banks. The net effect was a marked 
increase in the riskiness of banks approved for government assistance as compared to their unapproved 
counterparts with similar financial characteristics. This result holds robustly whether bank risk is measured by 
earnings volatility, stock volatility, market beta, or the distance to default (z-score). For example, after the bailout, 
approved banks show a 21.4% increase in default risk and an 11.9% increase in beta relative to unapproved banks.  
One important consideration in interpreting our results is the selection of banks approved for CPP. Since 
the approval of banks is not random, it is possible that the Treasury approved those banks that were more likely to 
experience a significant future shock as a result of their crisis exposure or other factors. It is possible that the 
approved banks would have experienced an even greater increase in risk without government aid.   
We address sample selection in several ways. First, we explicitly control for the proxies of the declared 
financial criteria used by banking regulators for evaluating financial institutions, such as capital adequacy, asset 
quality, profitability, and liquidity, as well as bank size, reliance on core deposits, exposure to regional economic 
shocks, and exposure to the financial crisis (foreclosures). Second, we estimate all our tests using an instrumental 
variable approach, with banks’ location-based connections to politicians on the House finance committees as our 
instrument for bailout decisions. For completeness, we also show the main results without the instrumental 
variable. Finally, we estimate all our tests in matched samples of approved and unapproved institutions based on 
measures of financial condition and performance. Our conclusions are very similar across these specifications.  
We review three non-mutually exclusive explanations that may account for the observed increase in risk 
at approved banks: (1) government intervention; (2) risk arbitrage; (3) moral hazard.  The first hypothesis – 
government intervention – posits that that the increase in risk taking at approved banks is a consequence of 
government intervention in bank policies aimed at increasing the flow of funds into subprime mortgages and 
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mortgage-backed securities. However, to the extent that bailed banks were subject to government regulations, 
these regulations sought to reduce rather than increase risk taking, for example, by limiting executive pay “to 
prevent excessive risk taking” and by restricting share repurchases and dividends to prevent asset substitution.   
To investigate this hypothesis, we collect data on banks that applied for CPP, were approved, but did not 
receive CPP funds for various institutional reasons discussed in Section 5.4. We then compare risk taking by this 
subset of non-recipients relative to the banks that did receive the money and were similar in size, financial 
condition, and performance at the time of CPP approval. We find a similar increase in risk taking across all banks 
approved for bailout funds, regardless of whether or not they received the money and were subject to the 
subsequent government regulation. As another test of the government intervention hypothesis, we examine 
changes in bank risk taking after the repayment of CPP capital. We find that the release from government 
oversight after the repayment of CPP funds has little effect on bank risk taking. Collectively, these results suggest 
that if government intervention played a role in banks’ credit rationing and investment decisions, it appears 
unlikely to have been the primary driver of higher risk taking.   
The second hypothesis – risk arbitrage – conjectures that some of the risky assets, such as subprime 
mortgages and investment securities, were significantly underpriced during the financial crisis, providing excess 
profit opportunities with relatively low risk.  In this case, the additional CPP capital may have enabled approved 
banks to exploit these opportunities without an ex-post increase in risk. Our results do not support this 
interpretation. First, we find that a shift toward riskier asset classes at approved banks was associated with an 
increase in loan charge-offs and investment losses, suggesting that these higher-yield assets were riskier not only 
based on ex-ante characteristics, but also based on ex-post performance. Second, a shift in approved banks’ credit 
rationing and investment strategies was associated with a significant increase in the market’s perception of their 
risk, as measured by stock volatility, beta, and default risk. Overall, while the extra capital likely played a role in 
banks’ investment and lending decisions, these decisions reflected a significant increase in risk tolerance rather 
than the allocation of capital to low-risk arbitrage opportunities.  
A third explanation – moral hazard – posits that a firm’s approval for CPP funds may provide a signal of 
implicit government protection of certain financial firms in case of distress. According to this hypothesis, there is 
some ex-ante probability that a given bank will be bailed out in case of distress. During a financial shock, the 
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bank either receives government protection or is denied it. If there is some consistency in the regulator’s treatment 
of banks across time, a bank’s approval for government assistance signals an increase in the probability that this 
bank will be protected again in case of future distress. Conversely, if a bank is denied government aid, the 
probability that this bank will be bailed out in the future goes down. This effect can be particularly significant in 
the short term, within the same crisis, since the government will prefer to avoid the near-term distress of banks it 
has publicly declared to endorse. For example, some bailed firms, such as AIG and Citigroup, received multiple 
rounds of government assistance. Under this interpretation, the bailout may encourage risk taking by protected 
banks by reducing investors’ monitoring incentives and increasing moral hazard, as predicted in Acharya and 
Yorulmazer (2007), Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2008), and Flannery (2010), among others.  
Our evidence appears consistent with a view that moral hazard likely contributed to the increase in risk 
taking at approved banks. In particular, the finding that higher risk taking is associated with the certification of 
government support, rather than with the capital injection itself, is consistent with this view. Further, our evidence 
indicates that the increase in risk taking was more pronounced at larger banks, which are more likely to receive 
continued government protection. Finally, we find that approved banks increased their risk primarily by investing 
in asset classes with a high exposure to the common macroeconomic risk. If government protection is more likely 
in case of a systematic rather than idiosyncratic shock to a firm, this evidence would be consistent with a strategic 
response of approved banks to a revised probability of future government support. This interpretation of empirical 
evidence is also supported by the evaluation of CPP by its chief auditor, the Special Inspector General of the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP).1 It is also consistent with the views about a shift in bailed banks’ risk 
tolerance expressed by prominent regulators in a testimony to Congress.2
Our article has several implications. First, one of the most significant recent events was a negative 
revision of the outlook for the long-term U.S. debt by Standard and Poor’s, followed by the downgrade in August 
2011 for the first time since the beginning of ratings in 1860. Among the reasons for a revised outlook cited by 
1 For example, in evaluating the consequences of government assistance on the financial sector, the SIGTARP report to 
Congress concludes that “To the extent that institutions were previously incentivized to take reckless risks through a “heads, I
win; tails, the Government will bail me out” mentality, the market is more convinced than ever that the Government will step 
in as necessary to save systemically significant institutions (SIGTARP, 2010, p. 6).” 
2 For example, in his testimony before the House Financial Services Committee on October 1, 2009, the former Fed 
Chairman, Paul Volker, stated: “What all this amounts to is an unintended and unanticipated extension of the official safety 
net…The obvious danger is that risk taking will be encouraged and efforts at prudential restraint will be resisted.”  
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the rating agency were the increased riskiness of U.S. financial institutions and a higher estimated probability of 
future government assistance to financial firms.3 Our paper identifies potential sources of the increased risk in the 
financial system and links them to the initial bailout policy and the predictions of academic theory.  
Second, earlier studies underscore the importance of bank capital for credit origination (Thakor, 1996) 
and economic growth (Levine, 2005). Our findings suggest an asymmetric response of financial institutions to 
capital shocks. In particular, while previous research shows that a negative shock to bank (equity) capital forces a 
cut in lending (Berger and Bouwman, 2011), we find that a positive shock to capital need not result in credit 
expansion, but instead may lead to a shift in credit rationing and an increase in risky investments. Finally, 
although bank capital requirements are used as a key instrument in bank regulation (Bernanke and Lown, 1991), 
we show that the strategic response of financial institutions to this mechanism erodes and, in some cases, reverses 
its efficacy. In particular, government-supported banks significantly increased their risk within regulated asset 
classes, while, at the same time, improving their capital ratios.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 describes our 
data. Section 4 discusses the empirical design. Section 5 studies retail lending. Section 6 investigates corporate 
lending and portfolio investments. Section 7 examines aggregate bank risk. A brief conclusion follows.  
2. Related Literature 
2.1. Theoretical Motivation and Main Hypotheses 
The government safety net has been long recognized as a cornerstone of the economic system. Its architecture 
includes social assistance programs, government insurance, and financial regulation. We adopt this broader 
perspective and begin with a review of key theoretical work on government guarantees in general economic 
settings. We then proceed with a more specific discussion of government guarantees in financial regulation and 
build on this work to motivate our main hypotheses.    
The early theoretical work on government guarantees has focused on social insurance programs such as 
social security and unemployment insurance. The classical studies in this area have established some of the first 
predictions regarding the unintended effect of government guarantees on agents’ incentives (Ehrenberg and 
3 Standard and Poor's Sovereign Credit Rating Report, "United States of America ‘AAA/A-1+’ Rating Affirmed; Outlook 
Revised To Negative", April 18, 2011, p. 4.  
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Oaxaca, 1976; Mortensen, 1977). In particular, government guarantees in the form of social insurance lead to 
moral hazard and perverse incentives for insured individuals and firms, imposing large welfare costs.  From a 
firm’s perspective, the moral hazard effect from government insurance manifests itself in riskier management of 
human capital and aggressive layoffs during crises (Feldstein, 1978; Topel, 1983; Burdett and Wright, 1989). 
From an individual’s perspective, the implicit reliance on government insurance results in higher risk tolerance 
and reduced effort (Feldstein, 1989; Hansen and Imrohoroglu, 1992).4
In the context of the financial sector, the role of government guarantees was first studied from the 
perspective of deposit insurance. In early work, Merton (1977) used a contingent claim framework to show that 
government deposit insurance provides banks with a put option on the guarantor. Unless insurance premia 
perfectly adjust for risk, this put option induces banks to take on more risk. In subsequent work, Kanatas (1986) 
has shown that even if insurance premia are periodically adjusted for risk, banks receive an incentive to 
strategically vary their risk exposure by demonstrating lower risk during assessment periods and engaging in 
aggressive risk taking between examination dates.   
A related set of theoretical work has reached broadly similar conclusions by studying another form of 
government insurance – loan guarantees. In particular, Chaney and Thakor (1985) show that the introduction of 
government loan guarantees creates incentives for firms to make riskier investments and increase leverage. These 
perverse incentives impose a significant cost on the government in the form of increased liabilities (e.g., Sosin, 
1980; Selby, Franks, and Karki, 1988; Bulow and Rogoff, 1989; Hemming, 2006). 
Perhaps one of the most extreme forms of government guarantees is a bailout of distressed firms. A 
central issue in the theoretical frameworks of government bailouts has been the effect of such a policy on firms’ 
risk taking. A number of studies show analytically that the downside protection from the government encourages 
risk taking by inducing moral hazard, both by individual banks (Mailath and Mester, 1994) and at the aggregate 
level (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007). These risk taking incentives can have far-reaching destabilizing effects on 
the financial system and the entire economy by raising its sovereign credit risk and the cost of national debt 
(Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl, 2011). However, a contrasting theoretical view argues that bailouts may reduce 
4 A number of more recent contributions derive similar conclusions and demonstrate the pernicious welfare effects resulting 
from perverse incentives introduced by government guarantees. Please see Fredriksson and Holmlund (2006) for a review of 
this work. 
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risk taking at protected banks. In particular, a bailout raises the value of a bank charter by reducing the 
refinancing costs and increasing the bank’s long-term probability of survival. In turn, the higher charter value, 
which a bank would lose in case of failure, acts as a deterrent to risk taking (Keeley, 1990). The disciplining 
effect of the charter value is predicted to be amplified under the conditions similar to those observed during the 
recent crisis. For example, when the bailout is discretionary and follows an adverse macroeconomic shock, the 
risk-reducing effect of the charter value may outweigh moral hazard, resulting in a lower equilibrium level of risk 
(Goodhart and Huang, 1999; Cordella and Yeyati, 2003).   
The primary goal of our paper is to investigate the effect of a bailout on firms’ risk taking behavior. 
Motivated by the debate in the theoretical literature, we formulate our central hypotheses as follows: 
H1a: A firm’s bailout is followed by an increase in its risk taking 
H1b: A firm’s bailout is followed by a reduction in its risk taking
2.2. Empirical Evidence 
A recent wave of bailouts around the globe has enabled researchers to provide empirical evidence on various 
types of government aid. In particular, government assistance in the United States and Germany has received the 
most attention in the literature and will be the primary focus of our discussion.  
In the United States, several studies have focused on the causes and consequences of government 
assistance programs during the financial crisis.  Veronesi and Zingales (2010) calculate the costs and benefits of 
the bailout from the perspective of large banks’ stakeholders and conclude that the government provided 
significant subsidies to bailed firms. Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) study banks’ incentives to participate in 
CPP and show that the bailout raised investor expectations of future regulatory interventions. Li (2012) 
investigates the determinants of government assistance decisions and studies the dynamics of asset growth at 
bailed banks. Duchin and Sosyura (2012) document the role of banks’ political connections in the distribution of 
CPP funds and show that government investments in politically-connected banks earned lower returns.   
Perhaps the closest to our article is a recent study by Black and Hazelwood (2012), which provides survey 
evidence on credit origination at bailed banks. In a sample of 29 TARP banks and 28 non-TARP banks, the 
authors find that after the bailout, most TARP banks shifted credit origination toward riskier loans, as measured 
by the survey’s internal risk rating. The authors show that the increase in risk is confined to large and medium 
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banks and attribute their results to moral hazard. This paper and ours provide complementary evidence from 
different economic channels – from commercial loans in their article to retail credit, syndicated loans, and 
portfolio investments in our paper. In addition, by combining the study of banks’ asset risk with the analysis of 
their capital positions, we provide evidence on banks’ aggregate risk. We find that the relative improvement in 
capital positions at bailed banks from federal infusions was more than offset by an increase in the risk of their 
assets, resulting in a higher aggregate risk and higher likelihood of default, as compared to unapproved banks.    
Outside of the United States, research on government interventions in Germany has provided a valuable 
long-term perspective. Gropp, Grundl, and Guettler (2011) use a natural experiment to study the effect of 
government guarantees on bank risk taking. They find that the removal of government guarantees for German 
savings banks leads to lower risk taking and conclude that government guarantees are associated with moral 
hazard.  Berger, Bouwman, Kick, and Schaeck (2012) study two types of regulatory interventions in Germany: 
disciplinary actions and mandatory capital support. The authors find that both types of interventions are generally 
associated with lower risk taking and liquidity creation at disciplined banks. Their evidence also yields two 
important conclusions: (1) the consequences of government interventions vary depending on the business cycle 
and have an effect mainly in non-crisis years; and (2) disciplinary actions against banks generate spillover effects 
on other banks, providing the latter with a competitive advantage.   
 The combination of prior evidence and our findings suggests a highly nuanced effect of government aid 
on bank risk taking. This effect appears to vary with the regulatory signal associated with capital infusions, the 
likelihood of regulatory forbearance, and the quality of program governance. We briefly discuss these factors.  
The first important factor is the type of the information signal – positive versus negative – that 
accompanies government assistance. In the U.S., government capital injections were voluntary and targeted a 
large fraction of banks. In this setting, an approval of a bank’s application for federal funds implied that the bank 
was viewed as sufficiently healthy and/or systemically important to receive a federal back-up (Paulson, 2008). In 
fact, weak financial institutions were denied government assistance (Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012). In 
contrast, in Germany, capital injections were mandatory and targeted the weakest 7% of banks. These injections 
sent a strong negative signal from the regulators that the bank is in distress and is put on close watch by the 
regulators. Consistent with this interpretation, the negative signals from the regulators – mandatory injections in 
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Germany and rejections of applications for federal funds in the U.S. – were kept confidential to avoid bank runs 
and were associated with a reduction in risk in both markets. In contrast, the positive signal of a federal back-up 
in the U.S. was associated with an increase in risk taking.  
The second important factor is regulatory forbearance. Previous research shows that regulators are 
significantly less likely to close weak banks during crises, when the financial system is more fragile and the 
number of distressed banks is large (e.g., Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007; Brown and Dinc, 2011). If these 
incentives reduce the perceived threat of closure for bailed banks, government assistance may be less effective in 
achieving its declared goals during financial crises. Consistent with this interpretation, Berger, Bouwman, Kick, 
and Schaeck (2012) find that government capital injections fail to restrict bank risk taking and have little effect on 
liquidity creation during financial crises, in contrast to non-crisis years. Similarly, we show that government 
assistance in the U.S. during the crisis had little effect on credit origination and was associated with an increase 
rather than a reduction in risk taking. An important caveat is that our study focuses on a relatively short period 
after federal assistance, and our findings may be specific to programs initiated during financial crises.  
A third important factor is the role of political interests in government intervention. For example, Kane 
(1989, 1990) argues that regulators’ short time horizons and political interests induce them to pursue a policy of 
forbearance, thus weakening regulatory enforcement in government programs. More recently, Calomiris and 
Wallison (2009) show evidence of politically-motivated regulatory forbearance during the U.S. mortgage default 
crisis. Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2010) document political motivations in the adoption of TARP, which was initiated 
shortly before the congressional and presidential elections. To the extent that such considerations played a role in 
CPP, our evidence suggests that the politicized nature of banking may distort risk taking incentives. Under this 
interpretation, our study adds to the literature on economic distortions from government intervention in the 
financial sector (Sapienza 2004; Khwaja and Mian, 2005) and in other economic settings (Faccio, Masulis, and 
McConnell, 2006; Cohen, Coval, and Malloy, 2011). 
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3. Data and Summary Statistics  
3.1. Capital Purchase Program 
On October 3, 2008, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) was signed into law. The act authorized 
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) – a system of federal initiatives aimed at stabilizing the financial 
system. On October 14, 2008, the government announced the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), which authorized 
the Treasury to invest up to $250 billion in financial institutions. Initiated in October 2008 and terminated in 
December 2009, CPP invested $204.9 billion in 707 firms, becoming the first and largest TARP initiative.   
To apply for CPP funds, a qualifying financial institution (QFI) – a domestic bank, bank holding 
company, savings association, or savings and loan holding company – submitted a short two-page application (by 
the deadline of November 14, 2008) to its primary federal banking regulator – the Federal Reserve, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), or the Office of 
Thrift Supervision (OTS). Applications of bank holding companies were submitted both to the regulator 
overseeing the largest bank of the holding company and to the Federal Reserve. If the initial review by the 
banking regulator was successful, the application was forwarded to the Treasury, which made the final decision 
on the investment.  
  The review of CPP applicants was based on the standard assessment system used by banking regulators – 
the Camels rating system – which evaluates 6 dimensions of a financial institution: Capital adequacy, Asset 
quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk. The ratings in each category, which 
range from 1 (best) to 5 (worst), were assigned based on financial ratios and onsite examinations. In Appendix A, 
we provide a description of our proxies for the assessment categories, along with the definitions of other variables 
used in our study.  
In exchange for CPP capital, banks provided the Treasury with cumulative perpetual preferred stock, 
which pays quarterly dividends at an annual yield of 5% for the first five years and 9% thereafter. The amount of 
the investment in preferred shares was determined by the Treasury, subject to the minimum threshold of 1% of a 
firm’s risk-weighted assets (RWA) and a maximum threshold of 3% of RWA or $25 billion, whichever was 
smaller. In addition to the preferred stock, the Treasury obtained warrants for the common stock of public firms. 
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The warrants, valid for ten years, were issued for such number of common shares that the aggregate market value 
of the covered common shares was equal to 15% of the investment in the preferred stock.  
3.2. Sample Firms 
To construct our sample of firms, we begin with a list of all public domestically-controlled financial institutions 
that were eligible for CPP participation and were active as of September 30, 2008, the quarter immediately 
preceding the administration of CPP. This initial list includes 600 public firms. We focus on public firms because 
the regulatory filings of public firms allow us to identify whether or not a particular firm applied for CPP funds. 
Public financial institutions account for the overwhelming majority (92.8%) of all capital invested under CPP. In 
particular, the 295 public recipients of CPP funds obtained $190.1 billion under this program, according to the 
data from the Treasury’s Office of Financial Stability. 
To identify CPP applicants and to determine the status of each application, we read quarterly filings, 
annual reports, and proxy statements of all CPP-eligible public financial institutions, starting at the beginning of 
the fourth quarter of 2008 and ending at the end of the fourth quarter of 2009. We also supplement these sources 
with a search of each firm’s press releases for any mentioning of CPP or TARP and, in cases of missing data, we 
call the firm’s investment relations department for verification. Using this procedure, we are able to ascertain the 
application status of 538 of the 600 public firms eligible for CPP (89.7% of all eligible public firms).   
From the 538 firms with available data, we exclude the seventeen large QFIs in our sample that were 
subject to stress tests under the Capital Assessment Plan (CAP).5  This sample filter is motivated by several 
reasons. First, there is some evidence that these firms were asked to participate in CPP by the regulators to 
provide a signal to the market at the early stages of the program in the fall of 2008.6  Second, on February 10, 
2009, the regulators announced that these firms will be required to participate in CAP. Under this plan, the said 
firms underwent formal assessment of capitalization levels, and nine of the seventeen excluded QFIs were forced 
5 The excluded firms include Citigroup, JP Morgan, Bank of America (including Merrill Lynch), Goldman Sachs, Morgan 
Stanley, State Street, Bank of New York Mellon, and Wells Fargo (including Wachovia), KeyCorp, Fifth Third Bancorp, 
Regions Corp., BB&T, Capital One, SunTrust, U.S. Bancorp, American Express, and PNC Financial Services. The two other 
firms subject to the Capital Assessment Plan, namely GMAC and MetLife were not part of our original sample of QFIs. In 
particular, GMAC, the financing arm of General Motors, received TARP funding through the Automotive Industry Financing 
Program (AIFP) rather than CPP. MetLife was excluded as an insurance firm with negligible (internet) banking operations.  
6 Solomon, Deborah and David Enrich, “Devil Is in Bailout's Details”, The Wall Street Journal, October 15, 2008. 
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to raise $63.1 billion in equity capital.7 Third, in contrast to CPP, the capital raised under CAP was in the form of 
common stock rather than preferred stock. Because of these distinctive features of the CAP firms, we follow a 
conservative approach and exclude them from our sample. However, our results are not sensitive to this sample 
restriction and remain similar if we retain these firms. These results are discussed in Section 5.5.  
Of the 521 firms in our final sample, 416 firms (79.8%) submitted CPP applications, and the remaining 
105 firms explicitly stated their decision not to apply for CPP funds. Among the 416 submitted applications, 329 
applications (79.1%) were approved for funding. Finally, among the firms approved for funding, 278 (84.5%) 
accepted the investment, while 51 firms (15.5%) declined the funds.  Figure 1 illustrates the partitioning of 
eligible firms into each of these subgroups.  
Figure 2 illustrates the typical application timeline for the median CPP applicant in our sample. To 
reconstruct the key dates in the application process, we collect this information for our sample firms from their 
press releases, proxy filings, annual and quarterly reports, and records of shareholder meetings. In Appendix B, 
we provide examples of firms’ disclosures regarding their CPP application process. The median firm in our 
sample received a decision on its CPP application in 19 calendar days after the CPP application deadline. For the 
median firm whose application was approved, it took an extra 12 calendar days to announce the firm’s decision to 
accept or decline CPP funds. Finally, for the median firm that accepted CPP funds, it took an additional 4 days for 
the funds to be disbursed from the Treasury. Overall, the vast majority (85.7%) of the publicly traded QFIs in our 
sample received CPP funds by the end of January 2009.  Figure 3 illustrates the cumulative disbursement of CPP 
funds for our sample firms in time. 
The average (median) amount of CPP investment in our sample was $144 ($30.1) million, as shown in 
Panel A of Table I.  The overwhelming majority of CPP applicants (82% of firms in our sample) received 
approximately the maximum amount stimulated by CPP, an investment equal to 3% of the firm’s risk-weighted 
assets.8  Figure 4 depicts the distribution of CPP investment amounts relative to the risk weighted assets of 
7 The list of the nine of the excluded QFIs that were required to raise capital is as follows:  Bank of America ($33.90 billion),
Citigroup ($5.50 billion), Wells Fargo ($13.70 billion), Morgan Stanley ($1.80 billion), PNC Financial Services ($0.60 
billion), SunTrust Banks ($2.20 billion), Regions Corp. ($2.50), Fifth Third Bancorp ($1.10 billion), KeyCorp ($1.80 billion). 
8 The conditions of the program establish the minimum CPP investment amount to be 1% of risk-weighted assets (RWA) and 
the maximum amount to be 3% of RWA or $25 billion, whichever is smaller. 
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recipient firms. Since the investment amount was largely hard-wired to the firm’s risk weighted assets, with little 
variation cross-sectional variation in relative terms, we do not focus on investment amounts.  
Financial data on QFIs come from the quarterly Reports of Condition and Income, commonly known as 
call reports, which are filed by all active FDIC-insured institutions. Our sample period starts in the first quarter of 
2006 and ends in the fourth quarter of 2010. Panel A of Table I provides sample-wide summary statistics for the 
Camels variables and other characteristics for the QFIs included in our sample.  
 The average (median) QFI has book assets of $327.4 million ($145.1 million). The Camels variable 
Capital Adequacy, which reflects a bank’s Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio, shows that the vast majority of banks 
are well capitalized. For example, the 50th percentile of the Tier 1 ratio in our sample is 10.7%, nearly double the 
threshold of 6% stipulated by the FDIC’s definition of a well-capitalized institution.  The variable Asset Quality
captures loan defaults and shows the negative of the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans. To measure bank 
earnings, we use the return on equity (ROE), which measures a bank’s net income relative to equity used to 
support both on- and off-balance sheet activities. The variable Earnings shows that the average (median) bank in 
our sample has a quarterly ROE of 3.2% (6.5%).  To proxy for a firm’s exposure to the financial crisis, we use the 
ratio of foreclosed assets to the total value of loans and leases. This ratio for the average (median) bank in our 
sample was 0.40% (0.15%). While Asset Quality is a forward-looking measure based on nonperforming loans, 
Foreclosures is a backward-looking measures based on assets that have already been foreclosed. Next, following 
Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012), we also construct an index of a bank’s exposure to regional economic shocks. 
For each bank, the index is calculated as a weighted average of the quarterly changes in the state-coincident 
macro indicators from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.9 The weights are computed for each bank as the 
ratio of this bank’s deposits held at the branches in a particular state to all of the bank’s deposits. These weights 
are revised annually based on the FDIC summary of deposits data. Finally, we also collect data on a bank’s 
funding sources. In particular, we compute the percentage of a bank’s funds obtained from core deposits. This 
variable helps control for the effect of the funding mix on banks’ lending policies, as discussed in Song and 
9 The coincident indexes are designed to capture the economic conditions in a state by aggregating the data on four state-level 
indicators into one statistic: (1) nonfarm employment, (2) average hours worked in manufacturing, (3) the unemployment 
rate, and (4) wage and salary disbursements deflated by the consumer price index. For more detailed information on the 
construction of the state-coincident macro indicators, please see the web page of the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank:  
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/regional-economy/indexes/coincident 
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Thakor (2007).  Panel A in Table I shows that the percentage of core deposit funding for the average (median) 
firm in our sample is 80.2% (81.0%).  
3.3. Loan Data
We obtain loan application data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) Loan Application Registry.  
This dataset covers approximately 90% of mortgage lending in the U.S. (Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven, 2012), 
with the exception of mortgage applications submitted to the smallest banks (assets under $37 million) located in 
rural areas.10 The unique feature of these data is its coverage of both approved and denied mortgages, which 
enables us to study bank lending decisions at the level of each application. This attribute is important for our 
empirical tests, since it will allow us to distinguish changes in credit origination driven by loan demand (the 
number of applications and their quality) from those driven by credit rationing of financial institutions.   
 At the level of each application, we are able to observe the characteristics of the borrower (e.g., income, 
gender, and race), the features of the loan (e.g., loan amount and loan type), and the decision of the bank on the 
loan application (e.g., loan originated, application denied, application withdrawn, etc.). The borrower and loan 
characteristics allow us to study changes in banks’ credit rationing across riskier and safer loans.  Finally, the 
HMDA data provide the location of the property underlying each mortgage application. This location is reported 
by the U.S. census tract (median population of 4,066 residents), an area “designed to be homogeneous with 
respect to population characteristics, economic status, and living conditions”.11  This level of data granularity 
allows us to focus on the differences in lending decisions by different banks within the same small region, while 
controlling for the conditions specific to the local housing market.        
  To construct our sample of mortgage applications, we aggregate financial institutions in HMDA at the 
level of the bank holding company and match them to our list of QFIs. Among the 521 QFIs in our sample, 498 
institutions reported their mortgage activity under HMDA in 2006-2010. Next, we limit our analysis to 
applications that were either denied or approved, thus excluding observations with ambiguous statuses, such as 
10 According to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, most depository institutions must disclose data on applications 
for home mortgage loans, home improvement loans, and loan refinancing. A depository institution is required to report if it 
has any office or branch located in any metropolitan statistical area (MSAs) and meets the minimum threshold of asset size. 
For the year 2008, this reporting threshold was established at $37 million.     
11 Tract definition from the U.S. Census Bureau, Geographic Areas Reference Manual, p. 10-1. 
http://www.census.gov/geo/www/GARM/Ch10GARM.pdf 
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incomplete files and withdrawn applications. Since the focus of our analysis is on credit origination, we restrict 
our sample to new loans, thus excluding refinancing and purchases of existing loans.  We also exclude loans that 
were sold in the same calendar year when they were originated because these loans have a comparatively smaller 
effect on the risk of the originating QFI. Finally, we drop observations with missing data.  
 Panel B of Table I provides summary statistics for our sample of mortgage applications. Approximately 
64.3% of applications are approved, and the median amount of the loan is $123,000. The data show significant 
variation in the loan-to-income ratio, a measure commonly used in the mortgage industry as an indicator of loan 
risk.12 This ratio in our sample ranges from 0.85 at the 25th percentile to 2.8 at the 75th percentile.  
 In addition to the analysis of retail lending, we also collect data on corporate credit facilities from 
DealScan. This dataset covers large corporate loans, the vast majority of which are syndicated (i.e., originated by 
several banks in a syndicate). DealScan reports loans at origination, allowing us to focus on the issuance of new 
corporate credit and to avoid contamination from the drawdowns of previously-made financial commitments. 
Each unit of observation is a newly-issued credit facility, which provides such information as the originating 
bank(s), date of origination, loan amount, interest rate, and the corporate borrower.   
According to DealScan, between 2006 and 2010, 179 QFIs in our sample originated $1.7 trillion in 
corporate credit. As shown in Panel B of Table I, the average (median) corporate loan amount during our sample 
period is $604 ($300) million. In our subsequent tests, we break down the newly-issued credit between approved 
and unapproved banks at the loan level, which allows us to control for the changes in investment opportunities of 
industrial firms. As a result, this data feature enables us to identify the effect of CPP, if any, on industrial firms’ 
access to credit, as proxied by the share of loans originated by CPP recipients in the firm’s funding mix.    
4. Empirical Methodology
The objective of our empirical design is to identify the treatment effect of CPP approvals on the risk taking 
behavior in the financial sector. To isolate this effect, we would like to control for several issues that may 
confound empirical inferences: (1) selection of CPP recipients; (2) changes in economic conditions; (3) changes 
in the distribution of credit demand between approved and denied banks.  
12 For example, the loan-to-income ratio is used by regulators in the assessment of mortgage risk in determining its eligibility 
for federal loan modification programs, such as the Federal Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP).  
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4.1. Selection
Since CPP recipients are not selected at random, we would like to control for the possibility that approved banks 
were selected on attributes correlated with subsequent risk. For example, if government assistance was provided 
to better-capitalized or more profitable banks, which were more likely to survive the crisis, these banks may have 
been better positioned to increase their risk after receiving federal capital. Under such a scenario, the subsequent 
increase in risk taking by approved banks could be explained by the selection of CPP recipients rather than by 
government intervention.   
 Several features of our data enable us to account for selection of recipient firms. A typical issue in most 
studies on government regulation is that the researcher can identify only the firms approved for government 
intervention, thus making it difficult to distinguish those that were denied government assistance (negative 
treatment effect) from those that did not request it (outside the selection group). In contrast, our data allow us to 
identify both applicants and non-applicants for government funds, to observe the selection of approved and denied 
firms, and to document the subsequent effect of both positive and negative treatment. Second, the criteria used by 
the government in its various forms of financial intervention in the private sector are typically unknown to the 
researcher. In contrast, our research design focuses on a systematic and structured government program with a 
unified decision framework and a known set of declared selection criteria.  
To account for selection of CPP recipients, we explicitly control for proxies of the Camels measures of 
financial condition and performance, bank size, reliance on core deposits, exposure to the crisis, and exposure to 
regional economic shocks. We note, however, that our Camels proxies are constrained by publicly available data 
and therefore constitute an imperfect measure of the true Camels ratings, which are never made public by the 
regulators. Furthermore, our measures cannot capture the onsite bank examination ratings. 
To further address the selection issue, we use an instrumental variable approach. Specifically, as an 
instrument for CPP approvals, we propose a firm’s geographic location in the election district of a House member 
serving on key finance committees involved in drafting and amending TARP. We consider a firm to be connected 
to a politician if it is headquartered in his or her election district. We consider a politician to be connected to 
TARP if he or she served on the House Financial Services Committee in the 110th Congress (2007-2008) and was 
a member of the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions or the Subcommittee on Capital Markets. These 
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subcommittees played a direct role in the development of the EESA and were charged with preparing voting 
recommendations for Congress on authorizing and expanding TARP. This role of the subcommittees fostered 
close interaction between committee members, banking regulators, and the Treasury. For example, Duchin and 
Sosyura (2012) provide examples of this interaction, where members of these subcommittees have been shown to 
arrange meetings between QFIs and the Treasury, write letters to banking regulators on behalf of particular firms, 
and even write provisions into the EESA aimed at helping particular firms in their home state. 
To construct our instrument, we define an indicator variable, House representation, which takes on the 
value of one if a firm is headquartered in a district of a House member who served on at least one of the two key 
subcommittees in the 110th Congress and zero otherwise. This variable definition is motivated by simplicity and 
ease of interpretation, and our results are very similar if we use alternative specifications, such as an index of a 
firm’s representation on each committee. 
  In our sample, 19.1% of CPP applicants have this type of political connection. The firms with a 
geography-based political connection in 2008 are also widely dispersed geographically, representing 31 states.13
In Appendix C, we show that House representation satisfies the inclusion restriction. This appendix reports the 
results from an OLS regression explaining the decision of CPP approval using House representation, Camels 
proxies, foreclosures, percentage of core deposit funding, exposure to regional economic shocks, and size. In the 
first-stage regression, the House representation variable is found to have a positive and statistically significant 
effect on CPP approvals. Accordingly, the F-test in the first stage model is highly significant (F-statistic = 16.76 
with a p-value less than 0.001), confirming the strength of the instrument. To complement the F-test, we also 
consider Shea's (1997) partial R-squared from the first-stage regressions. The R-squared exceeds the suggested 
(rule of thumb) hurdle of 10%, with a value of 14.2%. These statistics suggest that our instrument is relevant in 
explaining the variation of our model's potentially endogenous regressors.   
Next, we consider whether the proposed instrument likely satisfies the exclusion restriction. We begin by 
providing a brief discussion of the appointment process of House members to committees and subcommittees.  
The first important factor in committee assignments is the fraction of House seats won by each party in the most 
recent elections, which affects the ratio of seats allocated to the party on each congressional committee. After 
13 States with two or more seats on the key subcommittees include AL, CA, CO, CT, DE, FL, GA, IL, IN, KS, KY, MA, MN, 
MO, NH, NJ, NY, NC, OH, PA, SC, TN, TX, and WV. 
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general elections are concluded, House leaders meet to determine party ratios on each committee via inter-party 
negotiations. For example, in the 110th Congress (2007-08), the Subcommittee on Capital Markets in the House 
Financial Services Committee consisted of 26 Democrats and 23 Republicans, but in the 111th Congress (2009-
10), this subcommittee included 30 Democrats and 20 Republicans. 
The second important factor in committee assignments is the pool of elected House members and their 
committee preferences. In particular, each House member can serve on no more than two standing committees 
and four subcommittees of those committees. Moreover, there are additional constraints on committees imposed 
by each party. For example, the Democratic Party, but not the Republican Party, considers the House Financial 
Services Committee to be an exclusive committee, and the Democratic members of this committee generally 
cannot serve on other committees. Ultimately, committee members are determined separately by each party in a 
process that considers the number of seats negotiated by the party, the constraints on committee memberships 
imposed by the House and by the party, and the preferences of individual members.  
Since the distribution of House seats and the pool of House members are determined in nationwide 
elections, these factors are likely outside of control for a given financial firm. Further, since committee 
assignments are reevaluated every two years, there is significant turnover in committee representation for each 
election district. These factors, combined with the relatively sudden adoption of the bailout program, make it 
reasonable to conjecture that a firm’s geography-based political connection is not directly related to a firm’s risk 
taking and credit origination, except through the effect of house representation on CPP approvals.
To account for selection of CPP-approved banks, we estimate all our tests using the predicted likelihood 
of CPP approval from the first stage regression reported in Appendix C. For completeness, we also show the main 
results without the instrumental variable. Furthermore, to accommodate various functional forms of the relation 
between the Camels measures and the approval for government funds, we repeat all of our tests in subsamples 
matched on the Camels variables. Specifically, we construct a subsample of approved banks matched on their 
approval propensity to other CPP applicants that were not approved for government funds. Since our sample 
consists of 327 firms that were approved for CPP and 87 firms that were not approved, we start with the sample of 
87 unapproved firms, and match each of them to the approved firm with the closest approval propensity score.  
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The propensity scores are estimated from a linear regression of the approval decision on a host of bank-
level variables, which include proxies for the Camels measures of financial condition and performance, 
foreclosures, and size. This procedure results in a matched sample of 174 firms, whose summary statistics are 
shown in Panel C of Table I. The two groups of matched firms are generally statistically indistinguishable with 
respect to the Camels proxies, crisis exposure (foreclosures), and size.  
In addition to the declared decision criteria, it is possible that the regulators used other, perhaps less 
tangible criteria in the selection of recipient firms. To control for these characteristics, our tests include bank fixed 
effects, which capture all time-invariant bank characteristics.  
4.2. Economic Conditions
The financial crisis was characterized by rapid changes in economic conditions across various parts of the United 
States. In this environment, a change in a bank’s risk may be induced by the worsening macroeconomic 
conditions in the regions to which this bank has significant exposure.   
 To account for the dynamics in the economy-wide conditions, we adopt the difference-in-difference
methodology as our main specification, thus controlling for the shocks common to the entire financial sector. To 
capture the heterogeneity in economic conditions at the regional level, we construct specifications with regional 
fixed effects, where each region is defined at the level of one U.S. Census Tract. This analysis compares credit 
rationing by approved and unapproved CPP applicants on loan applications submitted within the same census 
tract, thus controlling for the differential effect of the crisis at a highly refined unit of geographic analysis.  
Finally, we also account for time-variant changes in economic conditions at the regional level by controlling for 
the state macro index of a bank’s exposure to regional economic shocks. 
4.3. Demand for Credit 
It is possible that federal capital infusions were associated with changes in the distribution of credit demand and 
the quality of borrowers between approved and unapproved CPP applicants. For example, banks may have been 
approved for federal funds because of the expected increase in credit demand in their markets. Alternatively, 
federal capital infusions may have changed borrowers’ perception of credit availability across banks, leading them 
to apply for credit at banks that received additional capital from the government.  
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 As discussed earlier, our empirical tests distinguish the supply-side changes in bank credit origination 
from the demand-side changes in the volume and quality of potential borrowers. At the retail level, we observe 
the incoming mortgage applications and study banks’ credit rationing across borrowers of various levels of risk. 
We also explicitly test for systematic differences in the volume of credit demand between approved and 
unapproved banks. At the corporate level, we focus on the within-firm variation in credit obtained from approved 
and unapproved banks at the level of each corporate borrower, thus controlling for each firm’s credit demand.  
5. Retail Lending 
5.1. Baseline Regressions 
In this section, we study the effect of CPP on credit rationing across borrowers with different risk characteristics. 
Our main empirical framework is a difference-in-difference model of credit origination, where the first difference 
is taken between the periods before and after CPP, and the second difference is taken between approved and 
denied CPP applicants.
To account for credit demand and capture the active credit rationing by financial institutions, we estimate 
a linear model of loan approvals, where each observation is a mortgage application, and the outcome variable is a 
bank’s decision to approve or deny the loan.  We use a linear model rather than a logit or probit framework 
because non-linear models tend to produce biased estimates in panel datasets with a short time series and many 
fixed effects. In particular, non-linear specifications give rise to an incidental parameters problem, which leads to 
inconsistent coefficient estimates.14  Furthermore, logit and probit fixed effects models generate biased estimates 
for interaction terms, our main coefficients of interest (Ai and Norton, 2003). Therefore, we follow the 
recommendation of the econometrics literature (Wooldridge, 2002) and the research design of other recent studies 
with panel data on loan approvals (Puri, Rocholl, and Steffen, 2011) and estimate a linear model of loan 
approvals. Our empirical model is estimated on a sample period from 2006 to 2010 and is specified as follows:  
14 The incidental parameters problem, first noted in Neyman and Scott (1948) and discussed more recently in Lancaster 
(2000) and Greene (2004), arises because the number of fixed effects increases without bounds, but the amount of 
information available for their estimation is limited, particularly in large panel datasets with a short time series. As a result,
both fixed effect estimates and coefficients on other variables tend to be biased in this setting.   
22
The dependent variable  is an indicator that equals 1 if a loan application by customer i at bank b for 
census tract c in year t is approved and 0 otherwise. The main independent variables include After CPP (an 
indicator that equals 1 in 2009-2010 and 0 otherwise), Approved bank (an indicator that equals 1 for approved 
CPP applicants and 0 for denied applicants), and LoanToIncome (a continuous measure of loan risk).  
There are several interaction terms of interest.  The interaction term After CPP x Approved bank captures 
the difference-in-difference effect of CPP on the overall volume of credit origination by approved banks (relative 
to unapproved banks) from before to after CPP.  The interaction term After CPP x Approved bank x LoanToIncome
shows how the marginal effect of CPP on loan origination at approved banks (relative to unapproved banks) 
varies with the level of borrower risk, as proxied by the loan-to-income ratio. As discussed earlier, the loan-to-
income ratio has been shown to be a good predictor of mortgage default (Campbell and Cocco, 2011). 
To capture the effect of CPP, we would like to control for bank characteristics which are correlated with 
CPP investments and which may also influence a bank’s credit origination. First, we include bank fixed effects, 
, to control for time-invariant unobservable bank characteristics. Second, we include controls, , for the 
following bank characteristics: size (the natural logarithm of book assets), proxies for the Camels measures of a 
bank’s financial condition and performance, the percentage of funding from core deposits, and proxies for a 
bank’s exposure to the crisis (foreclosures) and to regional economic shocks (state macro index).  
We would also like to control for the effect of regulatory interventions – namely, the disciplinary actions 
imposed on banks by their regulators, such as cease-and-desist orders, restrictions on lending, and suspension of 
certain banking operations. Berger, Bouwman, Kick, and Schaeck (2012) find that regulatory interventions are 
associated with a decline in risk-taking and lending in Germany. To control for regulatory interventions, we 
collect data on all publicly disclosed disciplinary actions imposed on U.S. financial institutions during our sample 
period by one of the four banking regulations: the FDIC, Federal Reserve, OCC, and OTS. We obtain these data 
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from the web-based databases of disciplinary actions maintained by each of the four banking regulators.15  The 
two most common types of disciplinary actions imposed on firms in our sample between 2006 and 2010 include a 
Cease and Desist Oder (208 cases) and a Supervisory Agreement (158 cases). 
To account for these disciplinary actions, we define an indicator variable Regulatory interventions, which
equals 1 if a disciplinary action was imposed on a bank in a given calendar year and 0 otherwise. This variable 
definition is motivated by the annual structure of our data on loan applications. In addition to controlling for the 
direct effect of regulatory interventions on credit origination (captured by the coefficient on Regulatory
interventions), we also include the interaction term Regulatory interventions x LoanToIncome, which captures the 
effect of regulatory interventions on the risk of credit origination, as measured by loan approval rates across 
borrowers of different risk.
Since our focus is on bank lending decisions, we would also like to control for variation in the quality of 
mortgage applications received by each bank. First, we include housing market fixed effects, , to compare 
lending decisions within the same census tract. Second, we include borrower-level characteristics that affect loan 
approval, such as the loan-to-income ratio and the fixed effects for borrower gender, race, and ethnicity ( ). For 
brevity, we do not report regression coefficients on these controls.  
In Table II, we present the results for the full sample of approved and unapproved CPP applicants, as well 
as evidence from the matched samples of approved and unapproved CPP applicants, constructed as discussed in 
the previous section. The columns in Table II correspond to different empirical specifications. In Columns (1) and 
(4), we report the results from our baseline OLS model, in which Approved bank is the predicted value from the 
first-stage regression reported in Appendix C, that is, from regressing CPP approval on House representation and 
control variables. In Columns (2) and (5), we include in the regression all banks, including those that did not 
apply and those with unverified application status. In the first stage, we estimate the CPP approval regression for 
all banks, setting CPP approval to zero for non-applicants and banks with unverified application status. In the 
second stage, we define Approved bank as the predicted value from the first-stage regression for all these banks. 
15 For example, the FDIC voted to disclose disciplinary actions taken against the FDIC-regulated banks in May 1985, and the 
regulation went into effect on January 1, 1986. The FDIC database of enforcement decisions and orders (EDO) is available 
online at: https://www5.fdic.gov/EDO/DataPresentation.html . Other banking regulators have adopted similar disclosure rules 
and provide similarly-structured databases. 
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Finally, in Columns (3) and (6), we define Approved bank simply as an indicator that equals 1 if the bank applied 
and was approved for CPP and 0 if it applied and was not approved.   
The empirical results, summarized in Table II, show a significant increase in loan origination rates for 
riskier borrowers at approved banks relative to unapproved banks. These results hold both in the full sample and 
in the matched sample and are statistically significant at conventional levels. In particular, the coefficient on the 
interaction term After CPP x Approved bank x LoanToIncome is positive and statistically significant at the 10% 
level or better in all cases. The economic magnitude is also nontrivial. Based on Column (3), relative to banks that 
were denied federal assistance, approved banks increased their loan origination rates by 4.9 percentage points for 
riskier mortgage applications, defined as applications with an above-median loan-to-income ratio of the borrower 
(median ratio = 1.78). Moreover, the relative shift toward riskier borrowers by approved banks (relative to 
unapproved banks) is observed only in the post-CPP period. In particular, credit origination rates for riskier 
borrowers were statistically indistinguishable between the two groups of banks before CPP, as indicated by the 
coefficient on the interaction term Approved bank x LoanToIncome.
We do not detect a significant effect of CPP on the overall volume of credit origination by approved 
banks relative to their unapproved peers, as evidenced by the coefficient on the interaction term After CPP x 
Approved bank. The coefficient on this interaction term is economically small, changes signs across 
specifications, and is never statistically significant across all columns. The results on other variables are consistent 
with the findings in the literature. In particular, the coefficient on the loan-to-income ratio is always negative and 
highly significant across all specifications, indicating that applications from higher-risk borrowers are less likely 
to be approved. Finally, the coefficient on the variable Regulatory interventions is negative and statistically 
significant in four of the six specifications. In addition to the overall credit-tightening effect of regulatory 
interventions, disciplined banks appear to further tighten approval rates for riskier borrowers, as indicated by the 
interaction term Regulatory interventions x LoanToIncome. The coefficient on this interaction term is always 
negative and statistically significant at the 10% level or better across all specifications. The evidence on 
regulatory interventions is consistent with the findings in Berger, Bouwman, Kick, and Schaeck (2012) that 
regulatory interventions are associated with a decline in risk taking and liquidity creation at disciplined banks.   
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Overall, our main finding is that after CPP, approved banks tilted their credit origination toward higher-
risk loans by loosening credit standards for riskier borrowers. This pattern would be consistent with a strategy 
aimed at originating assets which produce higher yields but do not cause deterioration in regulatory ratios, since 
the main regulatory ratios do not distinguish between higher-risk and lower-risk mortgages.16
5.2. Cross-Sectional Evidence 
In this section, we evaluate how our main findings on risk taking vary with bank characteristics, such as size, 
capitalization, organizational form, and exposure to the crisis.  In particular, we reestimate the baseline regression 
of loan approvals in subsamples partitioned on these key characteristics.  
We begin by investigating how our results vary across banks of different size. Prior research suggests that 
there are significant differences in credit policies of large and small banks. For example, Berger, Miller, Petersen, 
Rajan, and Stein (2005) show that large banks have different balance sheet compositions, borrower clienteles, and 
lending practices than small banks. Yet it is less clear how the differences between large and small banks are 
associated with risk. On the one hand, bank size may be positively related to risk taking since large banks have 
the potential to diversify their assets and absorb a greater level of risk (Saunders, Strock, and Travlos, 1990).  
Also, to the extent that bank size captures market power in the loan market, this market power can lead to riskier 
loan portfolios (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005; Berger, Klapper, Turk-Ariss, 2009). On the other hand, greater 
market power of large banks increases their franchise value. In turn, a higher franchise value, which a bank stands 
to lose in case of insolvency, has been shown to deter risk taking (Marcus, 1984; Keeley, 1990; Demsetz, 
Saidenberg, and Strahan, 1996; Carletti and Hartmann, 2003). While even the general relation between bank size 
and risk taking remains an open question, we know even less about the differences in risk taking between large
and small banks in response to government support. Our next tests provide evidence in this direction.
In Columns (1) and (2) of Table III, we split the banks in our sample at the median value of book assets 
($145 million) and reestimate our main difference-in-difference model of loan approvals. The estimation results 
16 For example, consider a closely monitored capitalization ratio, Tier-1 risk-based capital, which is commonly used as a 
measure of bank capital adequacy. The ratio is computed by dividing bank’s capital by the risk-weighted bank assets (all 
assets are divided into risk classes, with safer assets assigned lower weights). The intuition is that banks holding riskier assets
require a greater amount of capital to remain well capitalized. According to regulatory requirements, all mortgages are 
assigned the same weight of 0.5. Under this methodology, a prime and a subprime mortgage of equal notional amounts would 
have the same effect on the ratio, despite the significant difference in the perceived risk of the borrower.  
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for the full sample and matched samples are presented in Panels A and B of Table III, respectively. The evidence 
in both panels is similar. First, our main finding of higher risk taking by approved banks (relative to unapproved 
banks) after CPP holds for both larger and smaller banks, as shown by the positive and significant coefficient on 
the triple interaction term After CPP x Approved bank x LoanToIncome. Second, the incremental increase in risk 
taking after CPP by approved banks (relative to unapproved banks) is significantly stronger, both statistically and 
economically, at larger banks. In economic terms, the increase in approval rates on riskier loans (above-median 
loan-to-income ratio) was approximately 5.5% greater at large approved banks than at small approved banks, 
relative to their unapproved counterparts. These estimates also provide economic insight into the drivers of the 
overall increase in the origination rate of riskier loans by approved banks reported in Table II. 
Our findings on bank risk taking are consistent with the evidence in Black and Hazelwood (2012). Using 
survey data, the authors study changes in the banks’ internal risk rating of originated loans at 29 TARP banks and 
28 non-TARP banks. They find that all but the smallest TARP banks increased risk taking after federal capital 
infusions, and this increase in risk was the strongest at larger banks. The similarity of our evidence suggests two 
inferences. First, our measures of loan risk based on borrower characteristics result in similar conclusions to those 
obtained from the risk ratings supplied by originating banks. Second, the increase in risk taking at the majority of 
TARP banks appears to be a conscientious decision to the extent it was noted in their internal risk assessments.    
Next, we study whether the effect of CPP approvals on bank risk taking varies with bank capitalization. 
The theoretical literature provides diverging predictions for the relation between capital and bank risk taking. On 
the one hand, higher capitalization levels may decrease risk taking because they reduce asset-substitution 
(Morrison and White, 2005) and strengthen monitoring incentives (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Mehran and 
Thakor, 2011). On the other hand, higher capitalization levels may push banks to shift capital into riskier 
portfolios unless this risk-shifting is constrained by the regulators (Koehn and Santomero, 1980). Furthermore, if 
higher capitalization levels increase banks’ likelihood of survival, banks may take on more risk because they 
estimate a lower probability of regulatory closure (Calem and Robb, 1999).  
In Columns (3) and (4) of Table III, we partition the banks in the sample at the median equity capital ratio 
(10.1%) and test whether the effects of CPP approval differ between high-capitalization and low-capitalization 
banks. We find that our main conclusions hold in both subsamples. In particular, after CPP, both subsamples of 
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approved banks increased origination rates on riskier loans (relative to unapproved banks), as indicated by 
positive and significant coefficients on the triple interaction term After CPP x Approved bank x LoanToIncome  in 
both Panel A (full sample) and Panel B (matched samples) of Table III. However, the shift in risk taking was 
significantly stronger for low-capitalization banks. For example, the point estimates on the said triple interaction 
term in the full sample are almost twice as large for low-capitalization banks as for high-capitalization banks 
(0.091 and 0.048, respectively). In economic terms, the increase in approval rates on riskier loans (above-median 
loan-to-income ratio) was approximately 4.8% larger at low-capitalization approved banks than at high- 
capitalization approved banks, relative to their unapproved counterparts.  
Consistent with our main results, we find no significant increase in lending in both subsamples partitioned 
on bank capitalization, as indicated by the insignificant coefficients on the interaction term After CPP x Approved 
bank in both panels. These findings are related to a recent study by Li (2012), where the author investigates the 
effect of TARP on credit supply. He finds an increase of 6.4% in the loan supply within the subsample of poorly-
capitalized TARP recipients. We believe that the difference in our results within this subsample is attributable to 
some of the following methodological distinctions. First, since changes in loan demand are unobservable in Li 
(2012), they may account for some of the identified increase in the book value of the loans. Second, the control 
group in Li (2012) includes all non-TARP banks, including banks that did not apply for TARP and banks that 
applied, but were rejected. Third, while we focus on publicly-traded banks to infer their application status from 
corporate disclosure, Li (2012) does not require this information and includes both public and private financial 
institutions. Under this last interpretation, it is possible that the stimulatory effect of TARP on credit supply was 
confined to small private banks with low capitalization.    
Next, we examine whether our results differ between banks with high and low exposure to regional 
economic shocks. We conjecture that banks with significant exposure to the hardest-hit states, such as Nevada or 
Florida, may respond differently to government assistance, as compared to banks located in regions that were less 
affected by the crisis. Since virtually all of the banks in our sample operate in multiple states, we measure a 
bank’s exposure to regional economic shocks using the state macro index. As discussed earlier, this index is a 
weighted average of the macroeconomic indicators across all states in which a given bank maintains active 
branches, and the weights represent the fraction of the bank’s deposits held in the branches within each state.   
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Columns (5) and (6) of Table III show the results in the subsamples of banks with high and low exposure 
to the crisis, defined as banks with above- and below- median value of their state macro index. The results 
indicate that the increase in risk taking at approved bank after CPP, relative to their unapproved peers, was 
observed within both subsamples. However, the point estimates suggest that the increase in risk was more 
pronounced at banks with a high exposure to regional economic shocks. For example, in Panel B of Table III, the 
coefficient on the triple interaction term After CPP x Approved bank x LoanToIncome for low-exposure banks in  
Column (5) is 0.040, significant at the 5% level, while the coefficient on this term for high-exposure banks in 
Column (6) is 0.074, significant at the 1% level.  
Our final set of cross-sectional tests studies whether the shift in bank risk in response to CPP approvals 
varies with the organizational structure of the financial institution. In particular, approximately 79.6% of CPP-
approved financial institutions are bank holding companies, and the remaining 20.4% are standalone banks. On 
the one hand, bank holding companies have a more diversified revenue stream because they operate as financial 
conglomerates. Moreover, even those holding companies that operate solely in the banking sector typically derive 
some diversification benefits from managing multiple commercial banks in different geographic markets or 
different market segments. The theoretical literature predicts that a higher level of a firm’s diversification is 
associated with a greater capacity to absorb risk (e.g., Lewellen, 1971). Under this argument, we should observe a 
larger increase in risk taking among bank holding companies in response to CPP approvals, relative to standalone 
banks. On the other hand, changes in government policies in other contexts have been shown to produce a quicker 
and stronger effect on the behavior of standalone banks (Campello, 2002).    
In Columns (7) and (8), we show the results of our main difference-in-difference tests of loan approvals 
for the subsamples of standalone banks and bank holding companies. While the increase in risk taking is observed 
in both subsamples, the economic effect is significantly stronger for bank holding companies. This finding is 
consistent with the theoretical predictions that revenue diversification provides a firm with a greater capacity to 
take on risk and permits wider boundaries for the variation of risk exposure over time.   
In summary, our main conclusions about the effect of CPP on risk taking and credit origination hold in a 
broad range of subsamples of financial institutions. From an economic perspective, the increase in bank risk 
taking in response to CPP approvals was stronger at larger and better-diversified financial institutions that have a 
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greater capacity to absorb risk.  The increase in risk was also more pronounced at banks with lower capitalization 
levels and greater exposure to the crisis that were arguably closer to financial distress.   
5.3 Possible Explanations 
In this section, we evaluate three non-mutually exclusive explanations that may account for the increase in risk 
taking at approved CPP banks: (1) government intervention; (2) risk arbitrage; and (3) regulatory arbitrage.  
The first hypothesis – government intervention – posits that that the increase in risk taking at approved 
banks is a consequence of government intervention in their policies aimed at increasing lending to riskier 
borrowers.  As our first test of this hypothesis, we collect data on banks that applied for CPP, were approved, but 
did not receive CPP funds for various institutional reasons. To identify these banks, we search QFIs’ press 
releases, proxy statements, financial reports (8K and 10Q), and news announcements in Factiva for any 
mentionings of CPP. We identify 51 such firms in our sample.  We then read these press releases and news 
articles to understand the reasons for the bank’s decision to decline CPP funds. Some examples of the reasons 
discussed by the banks include restrictions on the issuance of preferred stock in the firm’s articles of 
incorporation, sufficient capitalization levels, and restrictions associated with CPP participation. For illustration, 
Appendix D provides sample disclosures of approved CPP banks that elaborate on some of these reasons.   
While all approved banks received the certification of government support in case of distress, only the 
banks that received federal capital were subject to CPP program conditions and possible government intervention.  
If government intervention was the main driver of the shift in risk at approved banks, we should observe the 
increase in risk only within the group of approved banks that received the funds. In contrast, in Column (1) of 
Table IV, we find that the increase in risk was similar across all banks approved for bailout funds, regardless of 
whether or not they received the money and were subject to the subsequent government regulation. This can be 
seen from the coefficient on the triple interaction term After CPP x Approved bank x LoanToIncome (in this 
column, Approved bank is defined as an indicator that equals one for approved banks that accepted CPP funds and 
zero for approved banks that declined CPP funds), which shows that the change in risk was statistically and 
economically indistinguishable between these groups of approved banks.  
Next, for the subset of approved banks that did not receive CPP funds, we construct a matched sample of 
approved banks that did receive the money and were similar in size, financial condition, and performance at the 
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time of CPP approval. In Appendix E, we provide details on the construction of these matched samples and show 
that these samples are statistically indistinguishable across a variety of measures of financial condition. Among 
the eight characteristics compared, only one – size – is significantly different.  In particular, approved banks that 
accepted the funds had somewhat larger book assets than the banks that declined the funds. Column (2) of Table 
IV reports the results in the matched sample of approved banks that received the funds and approved banks that 
did not receive the funds. As in Column (1), we find that the increase in risk was similar across all banks 
approved for bailout funds, regardless of whether or not they received the funds and were subject to the 
subsequent government regulation.  
As another test of the government intervention hypothesis, we examine changes in bank risk taking for 
firms that repaid their capital quickly. We obtain data on the timing and amount of CPP repayments from the 
Treasury’s Office of Financial Stability. In Columns (3) and (4) of Table IV, we focus on the subset of banks that 
repaid their CPP capital in 2009 and were relieved of CPP constraints and possible government intervention. In 
Column (3), we compare approved banks that repaid CPP funds in 2009 and banks whose CPP applications were 
not approved. In Column (4), we construct a matched sample of these two groups of banks based on the one-to-
one matching procedure according to the propensity score for CPP approval. We find that CPP approvals were 
followed by an increase in risk taking at these firms that was comparable to, albeit a bit smaller than, that 
observed in the main sample (point estimates on the triple interaction term of 0.056 and 0.051 relative to the point 
estimate of 0.080 in Column (1) of Table II). However, due to the smaller sample size, the statistical significance 
of the increase in risk in this subsample declines, as evidenced by an increase in p-values. 
Collectively, the results of both tests of the government intervention hypothesis appear to provide similar 
conclusions. In particular, to the extent that government intervention played a role in banks’ credit rationing and 
investment decisions, it appears unlikely to have been the primary driver of higher risk-taking.   
The second hypothesis – risk arbitrage – conjectures that some of the risky assets, such as subprime 
mortgages and investment securities, were significantly underpriced during the financial crisis, providing excess 
profit opportunities with relatively little risk. In this case, the additional CPP capital may have enabled bailed 
banks to exploit these opportunities without an ex-post increase in risk.  
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To test this hypothesis, we first study the changes in net loan charge-offs at approved banks relative to 
their unapproved counterparts, using a difference-in-difference regression framework, where the dependent 
variable is the fraction of loan charge-offs relative to total loans. One limitation in this analysis is that we have a 
relatively short post-CPP time period. This is somewhat mitigated by the evidence that a significant fraction of 
mortgage defaults tends to be concentrated during the first two years of a loan’s life, the time horizon of choice in 
many recent studies on loan performance (Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig, 2010; Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 
2011; Rajan, Seru, and Vig, 2012). Another limitation is that our data do not allow us to track the specific loans 
approved after CPP. Consequently, the observed loan charge-offs are likely to reflect loan losses on loans 
approved both before and after CPP. However, to the extent that denied CPP applicants had a lower quality of 
loan portfolios (Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012), likely to materialize in future loan delinquencies, this effect 
would bias our tests towards finding an increase in loan charge-offs at denied banks relative to approved banks. In 
contrast, our findings indicate the opposite pattern. In particular, Columns (5) and (6) of Table IV show a 
significant increase in loan charge-offs at approved CPP banks relative to their denied peers in the full and 
matched samples, respectively. This is indicated by the positive and significant interaction term After CPP x 
Approved bank, which captures the incremental increase in loan delinquencies of approved banks relative to 
unapproved banks in the period after CPP. This effect is also economically significant. In particular, based on 
Column (5), the net charge-offs at approved banks after CPP increased by 6.2% more than at unapproved banks.   
As a second test of the risk arbitrage hypothesis, we offer evidence from the market-based measures of 
bank risk. As we discuss in more detail in Section 7, a shift in approved banks’ credit rationing was associated 
with a significant increase in these banks’ beta, stock volatility, and risk of default. Collectively, the evidence 
from the ex-post loan performance and market-based measures of bank risk indicates that the shift in approved 
banks’ credit origination toward higher-yield loans reflected a significant increase in banks’ risk tolerance rather 
than the allocation of capital to low-risk arbitrage opportunities.  
A third explanation – moral hazard – posits that a firm’s approval for CPP funds provides a signal of 
implicit government protection of certain financial firms in case of distress. Because the government has 
incentives to prevent the failure of firms it has declared to support, the bailout may encourage risk taking by 
protected banks, as discussed in the introduction.   
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Several empirical results suggest that moral hazard likely contributed to the observed shift in bank risk. 
First, the finding that higher risk taking is associated with the certification of government support, rather than with 
the capital injection itself, is consistent with the effect of a revised probability of government protection derived 
in the theoretical literature (Mailath and Mester, 1994 and Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007). Second, the cross-
sectional evidence on risk shifting aligns well with the analytical predictions in the models of moral hazard. In 
particular, the increase in risk taking in response to a revision of bailout expectations was significantly stronger at 
larger banks, for which a bailout program is most likely to result in moral hazard. Moreover, the increase in risk 
taking in response to the bailout is stronger at banks that are closer to financial distress, as proxied by weak 
capitalization levels and greater exposure to crisis-hit regions. Proximity to financial distress increases the value 
of the put option from the implicit government protection and creates moral hazard by providing a manager with a 
greater incentive to increase risk, since such a firm has less to lose before it reaches the critical capitalization level 
that triggers continued government support. As an example of this continued government support in the context of 
CPP, dozens of CPP banks that found their capitalization levels depleted after federal capital infusions were 
allowed by the Treasury to skip their dividend payments on federal capital, and some received follow-up rounds 
of capital support. Third, the evidence suggests a strategic aspect in the risk taking behavior by approved banks, 
consistent with moral hazard. In particular, approved banks increased their risk primarily by investing in asset 
classes with a high exposure to the common macroeconomic risk and increased their risk exposure mostly within 
the regulated asset classes, thus reducing the effect on regulatory ratios. If government protection is more likely in 
case of a systematic rather than idiosyncratic shock to a firm, this evidence would be consistent with a strategic 
response of approved banks to a revised probability of future government support.  
Overall, the increase in risk taking by government-approved banks was likely associated with a 
combination of factors, including an increase in available capital, possible government guidelines, and reaching 
for yield in credit origination. Though it is difficult to assess the relative impact of these incentives, our evidence 
suggests that moral hazard from a revised probability of government support was likely a contributing factor.    
5.4 Robustness 
In this section, we evaluate the robustness of our results to the variation in the sample period, alternative inclusion 
criteria for sample firms, and the dynamics of loan demand.   
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In Panels A and B of Table V, we test the robustness of our results to different sample periods, using the 
full sample and matched sample, respectively.  So far, we have classified 2006–2008 as the period “Before CPP” 
and 2009-2010 as the period “After CPP”.  One concern is that the period of 2006-2007 might be less suitable as a 
benchmark because it coincides with the peak of the housing market. To address this issue, Column (1) in Panels 
A and B excludes loan applications processed in 2006-2007. Second, it is likely that bank risk taking in 2008 was 
affected by the financial crisis. Therefore, in Column (2) of Panels A and B, we reestimate our main specification 
after excluding loan applications processed in 2008. Third, we would like to evaluate the robustness of our results 
to excluding the year 2009, when bank risk taking was most likely affected by the crisis. In this case, a possible 
concern is that our tests might be picking up a crisis effect that hit CPP recipients harder. To test this prediction, 
in Column (3), we reestimate our main results after excluding loan applications processed in 2009. Finally, in 
Column (4), we exclude loan applications processed in 2010, since a number of institutions (42 of the 278 CPP 
recipients in our main sample) repaid their CPP funds by the beginning of 2010.  
The results reported in Columns (1)-(4) of Panels A and B suggest that our findings are robust to 
alternative definitions of time periods. In particular, the main results on the increase in risk taking by CPP 
recipients are qualitatively similar across all columns in the full sample (Panel A) and in the matched sample 
(Panel B). The interaction term After CPP x Approved bank x Loan-to-income is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level or better in all columns but Column (2) of Panel A, where it is significant at 10%.  
Next, we consider the robustness of our results to the changes in CPP conditions introduced by the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, which was signed into law on February 17, 2009. In 
particular, the ARRA imposed a number of additional restrictions on TARP recipients, including claw-back 
provisions in executive compensation in case of earnings restatements, prohibitions of golden parachutes, and 
limits on luxury expenditures and incentive pay.17 While the vast majority (89.6%) of CPP firms in our sample 
received their funds before the ARRA, we would like to verify the robustness of our findings to excluding firms 
that received CPP funds after the ARRA. This analysis is presented in Column (5) of Panels A and B in Table V. 
We would also like to account for the possible expectation of the ARRA before it was passed. Therefore, we also 
exclude firms that received CPP funds after December 31, 2008 and present our results in Column (6) of Panels A 
17 For details, please see the text of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, available online at:  
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr1enr/pdf/BILLS-111hr1enr.pdf 
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and B in Table V. Our main results are qualitatively similar, as indicated by the positive and statistically 
significant coefficient on the triple interaction term of interest in Columns (5) and (6) across both panels. This 
evidence suggests that our results are unlikely to be driven by the timing of the decision to accept or reject CPP 
funds or by the institutional restrictions that were subsequently introduced in the later stages of the program. 
Next, we evaluate the robustness of our findings to alternative filters in sample construction related to 
sample firms, the treatment of mergers and acquisitions, and the treatment of loan demand. These results are 
presented in Panel C (full sample) and Panel D (matched sample) of Table V. In Column (1) of Panel C, we 
include in our sample the CPP recipients subject to the Capital Assessment Plan.18 We find that all the main 
conclusions hold in this expanded sample. In particular, we find no significant changes in the volume of credit 
approvals between approved and denied banks after CPP, as shown by the insignificant coefficient on the 
interaction term After CPP x Approved bank.  Also, our main finding – the increase in the origination rate of 
riskier loans by approved banks after CPP – holds in this expanded sample. In particular, the coefficient on the 
triple interaction term of interest, After CPP x Approved bank x Loan-to-income is positive and statistically 
significant (p-value of 0.031). According to the point estimate on this coefficient in Column (1), relative to banks 
that were denied federal assistance, approved banks increased their loan origination rates by 6.0 percentage points 
for riskier mortgage applications (as defined earlier). Moreover, as in our main tests, the relative shift toward 
riskier borrowers by approved banks (relative to unapproved banks) is observed only in the post-CPP period. In 
particular, origination rates for riskier loans were statistically indistinguishable between approved and denied 
banks before CPP, as indicated by the insignificant coefficient on the term Approved bank x Loan-to-Income.
Next, we examine the robustness of our findings to FDIC-facilitated acquisitions. One concern is that 
some CPP recipients were asked by the FDIC to acquire distressed banks, whose lending practices were riskier 
compared to the average bank. In this case, our findings that CPP recipients increased lending to riskier borrowers 
may reflect the acquisition of riskier lenders. To control for this, we collect data on the FDIC-facilitated 
acquisitions in 2006-2010 by our sample firms from the FDIC online directory, and exclude from our sample the 
18 In Column (1) of Panel D, we also present this analysis in the matched sample.  However, the addition of the firms subject 
to stress tests does not change the matched sample analysis presented earlier, since none of these large firms are better 
matches for the firms that were unapproved for CPP funds (based on propensity scores). Therefore, the inclusion of these 
large firms does not affect the matched pairs constructed earlier. We present these results for completeness.   
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63 banks that took part in such transactions. Column (2) of Panels C and D reports the results of our tests in this 
subsample. Our findings hold, suggesting that the evidence cannot be explained by regulator-facilitated deals.  
In our main analysis, we have included approved CPP participants that did not receive government funds 
as part of our treatment group. Though the results in the previous section suggest that the increase in risk taking is 
attributable to the certification of government support rather than the receipt of extra capital, we would like to 
evaluate the robustness of our findings to excluding approved CPP applicants that did not receive federal capital.  
In Column (3) of Panels C and D, we exclude approved CPP banks that declined government funds and obtain 
similar results. In particular, the coefficient on the triple interaction term is positive, significant at the 5% level, 
and has a comparable magnitude (e.g., 0.088 in the full sample) to that reported earlier (0.080 in the full sample in 
Column (1) of Table II). The coefficients on other variables are also similar to those observed earlier.  
In our final set of robustness tests, we focus on the distribution of loan demand between approved and 
denied CPP banks. So far, we have controlled for loan demand by estimating our tests at the level of loan 
applications submitted in each geographic region. We proceed with formal tests of the effect of government 
assistance on loan demand in Columns (4)-(6) of Panel C (full sample) and Panel D (matched sample). 
 In Column (4) of Panels C and D, we use a difference-in-difference framework to study relative changes 
in the risk profile of mortgage applications received by banks that were approved for CPP, relative to banks that 
were denied CPP funds.  The dependent variable (and the unit of analysis) is the loan-to-income ratio of mortgage 
applications received. The results indicate no significant differences in the loan-to-income ratios of applications 
received between approved and unapproved banks. The coefficient on the interaction term After CPP x Approved 
bank is economically small and statistically indistinguishable from zero (p-values of 0.868 and 0.558), suggesting 
that CPP approvals did not materially affect the distribution of riskier borrowers between the two groups of banks.  
Column (5) of Panels C and D examines whether CPP approvals had an effect on the number of mortgage 
applications received by a bank. The dependent variable is the total number of applications received by a bank 
each year, normalized by the bank’s book assets. The regression results indicate no significant differences in the 
number of mortgage applications received by approved and unapproved banks. The coefficient on the interaction 
term After CPP x Approved bank is not statistically significant, suggesting that CPP approvals did not 
significantly shift credit demand between approved and unapproved banks. This result is consistent with the view 
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that the Treasury did not publicly announce denials of CPP applications, and, as a result, it is unlikely that 
borrowers perceived different credit availability between approved and denied banks.   
 Column (6) of Panels C and D examines whether CPP had an effect on the amount of mortgage loans 
requested on borrower applications at approved and denied banks. The dependent variable is the total dollar 
amount of loan applications received by a bank each year, normalized by the bank’s book assets. The regression 
results indicate no significant differences between approved and unapproved banks after CPP. The coefficient on 
the interaction term After CPP x Approved bank is not statistically significant, suggesting that CPP approvals did 
not have a material effect on the amount of credit demanded by borrowers at approved and unapproved banks.  
 In summary, CPP approvals do not appear to have had a material effect on the distribution of credit 
demand across banks. These findings suggest that the increase in approval rates for riskier borrowers, observed 
for approved banks compared to unapproved banks, is likely driven by credit rationing (or the supply of credit) 
rather than by credit demand. This shift in credit rationing at approved banks is robust to alternative definitions of 
time periods, holds in various subsamples, and cannot be explained by regulator-facilitated acquisitions.  
6. Extensions 
So far, we have focused on retail lending.  In this section, we extend our analysis by studying the effect of CPP on 
two other channels of bank operations: (1) corporate lending and (2) portfolio investments. While we believe that 
the richness of data in the mortgage market provides the cleanest empirical setting, we offer these additional tests 
as complementary evidence. We also alert the reader to some of the limitations of this extended analysis.   
6.1 Corporate Lending 
We study the effect of CPP on corporate credit by investigating the origination of large, mostly syndicated loans 
by approved and denied CPP banks before and after the bailout. There are two important caveats in this analysis. 
First, in contrast to the mortgage market, we do not observe loan applications by corporate borrowers. Therefore, 
to control for credit demand by borrowing firms, we focus on within-borrower variation in credit supplied by 
approved and denied banks. This approach allows us to control for the changes in investment opportunities (credit 
demand) at the level of each borrowing firm. The second caveat is that while the amount of each syndicated loan 
issued to a corporate borrower is reported, the exact share supplied by each bank in a given credit facility is 
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missing in the majority of observations in DealScan. Therefore, our tests focus on the fraction of approved (vs. 
denied banks) at the level of each syndicated loan. An implicit assumption in this analysis is that banks with an 
equal status in the syndicate, on average, support an equal share of each credit facility.  
 In Panel A of Table VI, we report the results of our tests of originations of new corporate credit by 
approved and denied CPP applicants. The unit of observation in this analysis is a corporate loan facility, and the 
dependent variable is the fraction of approved banks within the loan facility. The key independent variables 
include the indicator After CPP and Borrower risk. We use three measures of borrower credit risk. The first 
measure is Cash flow volatility, calculated as the volatility of earnings, net of taxes and interest, scaled by total 
assets, over the previous ten years. The second measure of risk is Intangible assets, defined as the ratio of 
intangible assets to total book assets. The third measure of risk is Interest coverage, defined as the inverse of the 
interest coverage ratio, calculated as the interest expense divided by earnings before interest and taxes. These 
measures are motivated by the literature on corporate credit risk, which shows a strong relation between these 
variables and the likelihood of default. The main independent variable of interest is the interaction term After CPP 
x Borrower risk, which captures the marginal effect of CPP on the fraction of loans extended to riskier borrowers 
by approved banks relative to unapproved banks. All regressions include bank fixed effects.  
In Panel A, odd columns provide evidence from the full sample of banks and even columns show 
evidence from the matched samples, as described earlier. We first focus on the evidence on Cash flow volatility.
The interaction term After CPP x Cash flow volatility is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level or 
better in the full and matched samples. These findings indicate that the fraction of CPP-approved banks in loans to 
riskier borrowers (those with higher cash flow volatility) has increased after CPP. The results are qualitatively 
similar for intangible assets and the interest coverage ratio. Specifically, the interaction term After CPP x 
Intangible Assets is positive across both specifications and statistically significant at the 10% level or better. The 
effects are also economically significant. For instance, based on the full sample model, a one standard deviation 
increase in cash flow volatility (4.8%) corresponds to a 6.6% increase in the fraction of CPP-approved banks for 
the average loan. These results suggest that after CPP, approved banks shifted their credit origination toward 
riskier corporate borrowers. This conclusion holds across various measures of corporate credit risk and 
complements the earlier evidence from the retail lending market.  
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6.2 Loan Yields and Loan Commitments  
As an additional test of the effect of CPP on the riskiness of originated credit in the retail and corporate markets, 
we provide evidence on the average yield of loan portfolios at approved and denied CPP banks. To the extent that 
approved banks shifted their credit origination toward higher-risk loans after CPP, this effect should be reflected 
in an increase in the average loan yield at approved banks relative to their denied peers with similar financial 
characteristics. We test this prediction by estimating a difference-in-difference regression, where the dependent 
variable is the average loan yield, as proxied by the ratio of interest income on loans and leases to the end-of-
period book value of loans and leases. Each observation is the average loan yield at a given bank in a given 
quarter. The main independent variables include the interaction term After CPP x Approved Bank, bank-level 
controls, bank fixed effects, and year fixed effects. 
 The regression evidence on the dynamics of loan yields at approved and denied banks is presented in 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table VI, Panel B. The main variable of interest is the interaction term After CPP x
Approved Bank, which captures the marginal changes in the average loan yield between approved and denied 
banks from before to after CPP. The coefficient on this term is positive and significant at the 10% level or better 
across both columns. Based on the point estimate in Column (1), CPP approvals were followed by a 1.2 
percentage point increase in the average yield on loan portfolios at approved banks relative to their denied 
counterparts. These results corroborate the micro-level evidence in the retail and corporate credit markets reported 
earlier and provide an aggregate, market-based measure of an increase in credit risk at CPP banks.     
We conclude our analysis of the effect of CPP on credit origination by providing evidence on loan 
commitments. This analysis seeks to complement our investigation of on-balance sheet activities with a study of 
the main source of off-balance sheet financing, which plays a significant role in liquidity creation (Kashyap, 
Rajan, and Stein, 2002; Berger and Bouwman, 2009). We use the same difference-in-difference regression 
framework as in the analysis of loan yields, except the dependent variable now is the amount of a bank’s end-of-
period loan commitments. The results of estimation in the full sample and matched samples are summarized in 
Columns (3) and (4), respectively. The coefficient on the main variable of interest, the interaction term After CPP
x Approved Bank is statistically insignificant, economically small, and has opposite signs, thus indicating no 
significant changes in loan commitments between approved and denied banks from before to after CPP.  
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Overall, the results on loan commitments are consistent with the earlier evidence from on-balance sheet 
credit activities, which indicates that CPP did not have a strong effect on the aggregate credit supply. Rather, the 
micro-level evidence from the retail and corporate credit markets shows that approved banks shifted their credit 
origination toward riskier borrowers, relative to denied banks. At the aggregate level, this shift was associated 
with a significant tilt of loan portfolios at approved banks toward riskier, higher-yield loans.  
6.3 Security Investments 
The evidence so far suggests that banks increased the risk of their loan portfolios after being approved for CPP 
funds. If this strategy reflects a general increase in risk taking by CPP banks, we are likely to observe a similar tilt 
toward higher-risk assets in banks’ portfolio investments. The advantage of analyzing portfolio investments is that 
the risk of financial assets is often more transparent and can be estimated based on market information.  
In our analysis of portfolio investments, we study whether banks increased their allocations to risky 
securities relative to other assets after they were approved for CPP funds. We examine both the aggregate 
measures such as total investment in securities and average interest yield, as well as the breakdown of securities 
into safer and riskier classes. To provide a simple and transparent classification, we define ‘lower-risk securities’ 
to include Treasuries and securities issued by state and political subdivisions. Conversely, we define ‘higher-risk 
securities’ to include mutual funds and equity products, mortgage-backed securities (excluding government-
sponsored agency obligations), and other domestic and foreign debt securities. For completeness, we standardize 
the measures of security investments both by a bank’s total assets and total security holdings.  
Table VII shows the results of difference-in-difference tests of investments in all securities, riskier 
securities, and lower-risk securities between approved and unapproved CPP applicants. We first consider the 
evidence in Panel A, which shows the results for the full sample. The results indicate that approved banks 
significantly increased their allocations to investment securities after being approved for CPP funds. For the 
average CPP bank, the total weight of investment securities in bank assets increased by 8.7% after CPP relative to 
unapproved banks. Within these portfolio investments, CPP banks increased their allocations to riskier securities 
by 6.8% relative to unapproved banks. In contrast, CPP banks reduced their investments in lower-risk securities 
by 11.2% relative to unapproved banks. 
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We also offer additional detail on the interest yields and maturities of banks’ portfolio investments. The 
results suggest that approved banks shifted their portfolios toward higher-yield securities after CPP, as compared 
to unapproved banks. In particular, after CPP, the average interest yield on investment portfolios of approved 
banks increased by 10.0% relative to unapproved banks. Similar conclusions about the increased risk of CPP 
banks emerge from the analysis of the average maturity of assets, suggesting an increase in allocations to long-
term securities.  Panel B examines portfolio investments using the matched sample approach. The results in Panel 
B are similar with somewhat higher point estimates. For example, after CPP, the total weight of investment 
securities in bank assets increased by 12.2% at approved banks relative to unapproved banks, and this shift was 
associated with a relative tilt in approved banks’ allocations toward riskier assets.
 Overall, the analysis of investment portfolios suggests that approved banks actively increased their risk 
exposure after CPP. In particular, approved banks invested capital in riskier asset classes and tilted portfolios to 
higher-yield securities, compared to denied banks with similar financial characteristics.  
7. Bank Risk 
In this section, we study whether the observed changes in the bank loan origination and portfolio investments 
influenced the overall risk of financial institutions. Since in a broad sense the two primary sources of bank risk 
include leverage and asset composition, we first examine the effect of CPP on leverage and capitalization ratios 
and then provide evidence on aggregate bank risk.  
7.1 Leverage and Capital Ratios 
We begin with descriptive evidence on the dynamics of capital ratios around CPP investments for various subsets 
of CPP applicants: rejected firms, approved firms that received funding, and approved firms that declined 
funding. For each group of firms, Panel A of Table VII shows univariate evidence on the dynamics of three 
capitalization ratios around CPP: (1) tier 1 risk-based capital ratio, (2) total risk-based capital ratio, and (3) equity 
capital ratio. The definitions of capital ratios are provided in Appendix A.  
 The evidence in Panel A indicates that across all capitalization measures, approved firms that received 
funding experience an increase in capitalization ratios. The increase ranges from 0.28 percentage points (Equity 
capital to assets) to 0.96 percentage points (Total risk based capital ratio) and is highly statistically significant at 
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the 1% level in all cases. The point estimates also show that rejected firms, as well as approved firms that 
declined funding, experienced a decline in capitalization ratios around CPP infusions, but this decline is 
statistically indistinguishable from zero at conventional significance levels.  
 We continue with regression evidence on the changes in capitalization at approved and denied banks. In 
Columns (1)-(6) of Table VIII, Panel B, we report the results of difference-in-difference regressions where the 
dependent variable is one of the bank capital ratios, and the independent variables include the interaction term 
After CPP x Approved Bank, and bank and year fixed effects. Odd columns correspond to the full sample and 
even columns correspond to the matched sample. Panel B reports the coefficient on the interaction term After
CPP x Approved Bank when the variable Approved Bank is defined both based on the IV approach described 
earlier (first row) and as an indicator that equals 1 when the applicant bank is approved for CPP (second row).  
Regression results for capitalization ratios suggest that after CPP, approved banks improved their 
capitalization ratios relative to unapproved banks. These results hold regardless of the definition of the variable 
Approved Banks, and are highly statistically significant at the 1% level. The economic magnitudes are also 
significant. Based on Column (1), for example, the tier 1 risk-based capital ratio increased by 13.6% after CPP 
relative to unapproved banks. This result is consistent with a significant inflow of new capital from CPP, 
combined with a lack of increase in credit origination relative to denied banks. 
7.2 Asset Composition 
The evidence from credit origination activities and portfolio investments suggests that after CPP, approved banks 
increased the risk of their assets relative to unapproved banks with similar financial characteristics. For loan assets 
at approved banks, this conclusion is supported by an increase in the origination of riskier loans, associated with 
higher average loan yields and more loan delinquencies. For portfolio assets, this finding emerges from greater 
allocations to riskier securities associated with an increase in the average yield on investment portfolios.  
  As an additional test of asset risk that aggregates the effect of investment and lending activities, we 
examine the volatility of ROA. In Columns (1) and (2) of Table IX, we estimate the same difference-in-difference 
regressions, where the dependent variable is the volatility of earnings. Here, too, we estimate the regressions in 
the full sample (Column 1) and the matched sample (Column 2), for both definitions of the variable Approved 
Banks (first and second row). The results indicate a significant increase in ROA volatility at approved banks 
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relative to denied banks, consistent with a shift toward riskier assets. For the average approved bank, ROA 
volatility increased by 33.4% (36.8%) in the full sample (matched samples) after CPP, relative to a denied bank 
with similar fundamentals.  
7.3 Overall Risk
In our final analysis, we examine the aggregate effect of the changes in banks’ leverage and asset composition on 
the overall bank risk. First, we examine the composite z-score, a measure of a bank’s distance to insolvency, 
which aggregates the effect of leverage and asset composition. The z-score is computed as the sum of ROA and 
the capital asset ratio scaled by the standard deviation of asset returns. Under the assumption of normally 
distributed bank profits, this measure approximates the inverse of the default probability, with higher z-scores 
corresponding to a lower probability of default.19   
Second, we complement the accounting-based measures with market-based estimates of bank risk: stock 
volatility and market beta. The advantage of these proxies is that they are based on market data and reflect the 
combined effect of the changes in leverage and asset composition on bank risk. We compute stock return 
volatility by using daily returns over a one-year horizon. To compute betas, we assume the market model (with 
the CRSP value-weighted index used as the market proxy) and use daily returns over a one-year horizon. Our 
results are also similar if we use market betas from a two-factor model, which is often assumed to describe the 
return generating process for financial institutions.20
 In Columns (3)-(8) of Table IX, we report the results of panel regressions of bank risk, where the 
dependent variables are the z-score, market beta, and stock volatility, respectively, in the full sample (odd 
columns) and the matched sample (even columns). The first row reports the results when the variable Approved 
Banks is defined based on the IV approach described earlier; in the second, Approved Bank is an indicator that 
equals 1 when the applicant bank is approved for CPP. The evidence across the columns and rows indicates a 
significant increase in each of the aggregate measures of risk. This suggests that the improvement in capital ratios 
19 The intuition for this result was first developed in Roy (1952). For a more recent discussion of the relation between z-score 
and bank default, see Laeven and Levine (2009).  
20 The two-factor model for financial institutions is based on the market risk and the interest rate risk, with the latter factor
approximated by daily changes in the Treasury rate (e.g., Flannery and James 1984, Sweeney and Warga 1986, Saunders, 
Strock and Travlos, 1990; Bhattacharyya and Purnanandam, 2010).
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at approved banks relative to denied banks was more than offset by an increase in the riskiness of the asset mix of 
approved banks. The net effect was a marked increase in total risk (stock volatility), market risk (beta), and the 
likelihood of default (inverse of z-score) at approved banks relative to their denied peers. The overall effect on 
bank risk is also economically significant.  For example, after the bailout, approved banks show a 21.4% increase 
in default risk (measured by the z-score) and an 11.9% increase in beta relative to unapproved banks with similar 
characteristics. One explanation for the increase in aggregate risk combined with a relative decline in leverage 
could be a strategic response of QFIs to regulatory capital requirements, such as a strategy designed to increase 
the profitability of assets, while, improving capitalization levels monitored by the regulators.  
 In summary, we find that banks approved for CPP shifted their credit origination toward riskier borrowers 
and titled portfolio investments toward riskier securities. This strategy was associated with an increase in 
systematic risk and the probability of distress. This evidence suggests that at least some approved banks 
responded to the bailout by increasing their risk taking and that this effect appears to outweigh the disciplining 
role of government monitoring and the regulatory constraints on incentive compensation of CPP banks. 
Conclusion
This paper has investigated the effect of government assistance on risk taking of financial institutions. While we 
do not find a significant effect of government assistance on the aggregate amount of originated credit, our results 
suggest its considerable impact on the risk of originated loans. After being approved for federal funds, CPP 
participants issue riskier loans and increase capital allocations to riskier, higher-yield financial securities, as 
compared to banks that were not approved for federal funds. A fraction of new capital inflows is also used to 
improve capital positions. Despite the improved capitalization ratios, the net effect is a significant increase in 
systematic risk and the probability of distress due to the higher risk of bank assets. 
The evidence in our paper is broadly consistent with the theories that predict an increase in risk taking 
incentives in response to government protection. From a policy perspective, our findings show that any capital 
provisions should establish clear investment guidelines and provide tracking mechanisms for capital deployment. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
A.1. Bank-Level Variables 
Camels Proxies 
Capital adequacy = tier-1 risk-based capital ratio, measured by the ratio of tier-1 capital to risk-weighted assets.  
Asset quality = negative of noncurrent loans and leases scaled by total loans and leases.  
Earnings = return on equity (ROE), measured by the ratio of quarterly net income to total equity capital. 
Liquidity = cash divided by deposits.
Sensitivity to market risk = sensitivity to interest rate risk, measured by the ratio of the absolute difference between 
short-term assets and short-term liabilities to earning assets. 
Capital Ratios 
Tier-1 risk-based capital ratio = tier-1 capital divided by risk-weighted assets.
Total risk-based capital ratio = total risk-based capital divided by risk-weighted assets. 
Equity capital ratio = equity capital divided by total assets.
Bank Fundamentals 
Size = natural logarithm of book assets.  
Percentage of core deposit funding = core deposits divided by total deposits.  
Exposure to regional economic shocks = weighted average of quarterly changes in the state-coincident macro indicators 
from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia across all states in which a given bank maintains active branches. The 
weights represent the fraction of the bank’s deposits held in the branches in a given state.  
Foreclosures = backward-looking measure of loan quality and exposure to the crisis, measured as the value of 
foreclosed assets divided by net loans and leases. 
Loan charge-offs = ratio of net loan charge-offs to total loans. 
Investment Portfolios 
Lower-risk securities = U.S. Treasury securities and securities issued by states & political subdivisions.  
Riskier securities = mortgage-backed securities (excluding government-sponsored agency obligations), other domestic 
and foreign debt securities, and investments in mutual funds and equity products.  
Long-term debt securities = debt securities with the remaining maturity greater than five years.  
Bank Risk 
ROA volatility = standard deviation of quarterly ROA over the trailing year.  
Z-score = ROA plus capital asset ratio divided by the standard deviation of ROA.  
Beta = market beta computed from daily returns over a one-year horizon, with the CRSP value-weighted index used as 
the market proxy.  
Stock return volatility = volatility of daily stock returns computed over a one-year horizon.  
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A.2. CPP and Financial Regulation 
CPP application indicator = indicator that equals one if a firm applied for CPP funds.  
CPP investment indicator = indicator that equals one if a firm received (conditional on being approved for) CPP funds. 
After CPP = indicator that equals one in 2009-2010 and zero in 2006-2008. 
Approved bank (specifications without instrumental variable) = indicator that equals one if a firm’s CPP application 
was approved.  
Approved bank (instrumental variable specifications)= predicted likelihood that a firm’s CPP application is approved 
based on the regression of CPP approvals on a firm’s geography-based House Representation, as defined below. 
House representation = indicator that equals one if a firm is headquartered in a district of a House member, who served 
on the Capital Markets Subcommittee or the Financial Institutions Subcommittee of the House Financial Services 
Committee in 2008. 
Regulatory interventions = indicator that equals one if, in a given year, a firm was subject to at least one disciplinary 
action from the four banking regulators (the FDIC, the Federal Reserve, the OCC, or the OTS). 
A.3. Credit Origination and Credit Risk 
Retail Lending 
Application approval = indicator that equals one if a mortgage application was approved.  
Loan-to-income ratio = loan amount requested in a mortgage application divided by the applicant's annual income.  
Corporate Lending 
Fraction of approved banks per loan = ratio of the number of CPP-approved banks in the loan facility to the total 
number of creditors in the loan facility.
Cash flow volatility = volatility of EBIT scaled by total assets, measured over a ten-year horizon.  
Intangible assets = ratio of intangible assets to total book assets.  
Interest coverage = inverse of the interest coverage ratio, measured as the ratio of interest expense to EBIT. 
Overall Credit Activity 
Yield on loan portfolios = interest and fee income from loans and leases divided by total loans and leases.  
Loan commitments = total unused loan commitments scaled by total assets. 
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Appendix B: Sample Disclosures – CPP Timeline 
Sample disclosures that were used for identifying CPP applicants and reconstructing the timeline of their application 
process
Example 1: Nara Bancorp 
“On October 29, 2008, Nara Bancorp, Inc. (the “Company”) filed an application with the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury (“Treasury”) to participate in the voluntary Capital Purchase Program (“CPP”). The CPP offers all 
qualifying financial institutions that are approved by the Treasury the opportunity to issue and sell senior perpetual 
preferred stock, along with warrants to purchase common stock, to the Treasury. On November 10, 2008, the Company 
received preliminary approval from the Treasury to participate in the CPP, up to the program’s maximum allowable 
amount of 3% of the Company’s risk-weighted assets, or $67 million. A press release announcing the Treasury’s 
preliminary approval of the Company’s CPP application is attached hereto as Exhibit 99.1.” 
Source: Form 8-K (p. 2) of Nara Bancorp dated November 10, 2008.  
“The board of directors of the Corporation (the “Board of Directors”) or an applicable committee of the Board of 
Directors, in accordance with the certificate of incorporation and the bylaws of the Corporation and applicable law, 
adopted the following resolution on November 20, 2008 creating a series of 67,000 shares of Preferred Stock of the 
Corporation designated as “Fixed Rate Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, Series A”.” 
Source:  Certificate of designations of fixed cumulative preferred stock (exhibit 4.1, p. 1) of Nara Bancorp.  
 “On November 21, 2008, as part of the Capital Purchase Program (the “CPP”) of the United States Department of 
the Treasury (the “UST”), Nara Bancorp, Inc. (the “Company”) entered into a Letter Agreement, incorporating an 
attached Securities Purchase Agreement – Standard Terms (collectively, the “Securities Purchase Agreement”) with 
the UST.” 
Source: Form 8-K (p. 2) of Nara Bancorp dated November 21, 2008. 
Example 2:  First California Financial Group 
“WESTLAKE VILLAGE, Calif., December 2, 2008 – First California Financial Group, Inc., today announced that it 
has received preliminary approval to participate in the U.S. Treasury Department’s Capital Purchase Program 
(TARP), with a preliminary commitment for $25 million in additional preferred equity. “ 
Source: Press release of First California Financial Group dated December 2, 2008.  
“The board of directors of the Corporation (the “Board of Directors”) or an applicable committee of the Board of 
Directors, in accordance with the certificate of incorporation and bylaws of the Corporation and applicable law, 
adopted the following resolution on December 17, 2008 creating a series of 25,000 shares of Preferred Stock of the 
Corporation designated as “Fixed Rate Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, Series B”.” 
Source:  Certificate of designations of fixed cumulative preferred stock (exhibit 3.1, p. 1) of First California Financial 
Group.  
“On December 19, 2008 (the “Closing Date”), First California Financial Group, Inc. (the “Company”) issued and 
sold, and the United States Department of the Treasury (the “U.S. Treasury”) purchased 25,000 shares (the “Preferred 
Shares”) of the Company’s Fixed Rate Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, Series B …” 
Source:  Form 8-K (p. 2) of First California Financial Group dated December 22, 2008. 
52
Appendix C: First-stage Instrumental Variable Analysis 
This table reports the first stage linear regression explaining CPP approvals with the instrumental variable House 
representation, while controlling for other bank-level variables. The dependent variable is an indicator that equals one if a 
firm’s CPP application was approved and zero if it was denied. The instrumental variable, House representation, is an
indicator that equals one if a firm is headquartered in a district of a House member, who served on the Capital Markets 
Subcommittee or the Financial Institutions Subcommittee of the House Financial Services Committee in 2008. All control 
variables are defined in Appendix A. The p-values (in brackets) are based on standard errors that are heteroskedasticity 
consistent and clustered at the bank level. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 
10% level, respectively. 
Dependent variable CPP approval 
House representation 0.124*** [0.005] 
Capital adequacy -0.003 [0.114] 
Asset quality -0.094 [0.172] 
Earnings 0.046*** [0.003] 
Liquidity 0.003 [0.920] 
Sensitivity to market risk 0.004 [0.231] 
Foreclosures 0.002 [0.511] 
Percentage of core deposit funding  -0.011 [0.326] 
Exposure to regional economic shocks 0.043 [0.174] 
Size 0.025 [0.169] 
Observations 416 
R-Squared 0.213 




Shea's (1997) partial R-squared 0.142 
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Appendix D: Sample Disclosures – Decision to Decline CPP 
Sample disclosures explaining firms’ decisions to decline CPP funds 
Example 1: Chemical Financial Corporation 
“Chemical Financial Corporation today announced that the Company has determined not to accept an $84 million 
capital investment recently approved as part of the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Capital Purchase Program 
(CPP). … Given the short timeframe between the release of the final CPP guidelines and agreements and the 
application deadline, the Company felt the prudent course of action was to submit its application to participate, and 
then take the opportunity to carefully consider all aspects of accepting funds awarded through the CPP. After such 
consideration, the Company's Board and management determined that the various restrictions and potential dilution to 
existing shareholders outweighed any potential benefits from the Company's participation in the CPP.” 
Source: press release of Chemical Financial Corporation dated December 18, 2008 
Example 2: United Bankshares
“United is honored to have been approved for participation in the Treasury’s CPP, which is only available to sound 
financial institutions. However, after careful consideration, we believe it is in the best interests of our shareholders not 
to participate. The program’s restrictions on possible future dividend increases, the dilution to earnings, and the 
uncertainty surrounding future requirements of the program outweighed the benefits of United’s participation in the 
program.” 
Source: press release of United Bankshares dated January 27, 2009 
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Appendix E: Matched Sample of Approved CPP Applicants that Received and Declined Funding 
The matched sample is constructed as follows. For each bank that was approved for CPP and declined funding, we find 
the closest approved bank that received funding based on propensity scores estimated from an OLS regression that 
explains the decision of approved banks to reject CPP funding using the Camels proxies, foreclosures, and size. The 
Table below provides difference-in-means estimates for the two groups of firms. 
Variable Declined funding 
Accepted 
funding Difference t-statistic 
Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio (%) 12.050 11.622 -0.428 0.612 
Noncurrent loans to total loans (%) 1.625 1.818 0.192 1.300 
Return on equity (%) 3.467 2.520 -0.947 0.326 
Cash holdings/assets (%) 3.836 3.847 0.010 0.027 
Sensitivity to market risk (%) 14.571 12.964 -1.607 0.995 
Foreclosures (%) 0.301 0.390 0.089 0.846 
Size (log assets) 











Sample Firms and Their Investment Applications 
538 Firms with known CPP 
application status 
521 Firms comprise  
the main sample  
329 Firms were approved 
600 Publicly traded firms  
eligible for CPP investments 
416 Firms applied for CPP 
investments 
278 Firms received CPP funds 
Exclude 62 firms with no 
information on CPP status 
Exclude the set of the 17 largest 
firms subject to the Capital 
Assessment Plan 
105 firms did not apply for CPP 
investments 
87 firms were not approved 
51 firms declined CPP funds 
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Figure 2 
Timeline of the Median CPP Application 
This figure shows the median length of time in each stage of the CPP application process for our sample firms with 
available data. Time intervals are shown in calendar days relative to day zero, the application submission date. For 
firms with a missing application submission date, the application is assumed to have been submitted on the day of the 
application deadline for public firms, November 14, 2008. Time spent on the decision to accept or decline CPP funds is 
computed for approved CPP applicants. Time spent on the disbursement of CPP funds is computed for approved 
applicants that accepted the funds.
Figure 3 
Cumulative Disbursement of CPP Funds
This figure shows the cumulative disbursement of CPP funds for 278 publicly-traded CPP recipients in our sample. The 
sample excludes the seventeen large CPP recipients that were subject to stress tests under the Capital Assessment Plan. 
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Figure 4 
The Distribution of CPP Amounts 
This Figure presents a histogram plot of the ratio of CPP investment amounts to risk-weighted assets of recipient firms. 
According to CPP guidelines, the minimum CPP investment amount is equal to 1% of risk-weighted assets (RWA), and 
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Table I 
Summary Statistics  
This table reports summary statistics for the data used in the analysis. The sample consists of all publicly-traded financial firms eligible for 
participation in the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) with available data on program application status, excluding the firms subject to stress tests 
under the Capital Assessment Plan (CAP). Panel A reports bank-level data. CPP application indicator is an indicator that equals one if a firm applied 
for CPP funds. CPP approval indicator is an indicator that equals one if a firm was approved for CPP funds (conditional on applying). CPP 
investment indicator is an indicator that equals one if a firm received CPP funds (conditional on being approved). The financial condition variables 
proxy for the Camels measures of banks’ financial condition and performance used by banking regulators, augmented with exposure to the crisis 
(foreclosures), percentage of core deposit funding, and exposure to regional economic shocks. Capital adequacy is the tier-1 risk-based capital ratio, 
defined as tier-1 capital divided by risk-weighted assets. Asset quality is the negative of noncurrent loans and leases divided by total loans and leases. 
Earnings is the return on equity (ROE), measured by the ratio of quarterly net income to total equity capital. Liquidity is cash divided by deposits. 
Sensitivity to market risk is the sensitivity to interest rate risk, defined as the absolute difference between short-term assets and short-term liabilities 
divided by earning assets. Foreclosures is foreclosed assets divided by net loans and leases. Percentage of core deposit funding is core deposits 
divided by total deposits. Exposure to regional economic shocks is a weighted average of quarterly changes in the state-coincident macro indicators 
from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia across all states in which a bank maintains active branches; the index weights represent the fraction of 
the bank’s deposits held in the branches in a given state. Panel B reports loan-level data. The mortgage application data are from the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA) Loan Application Registry. Application approval is an indicator that equals one if the mortgage application was approved 
and zero if it was denied. Loan to income ratio is the loan amount divided by the applicant's annual income. The corporate loan data are from 
DealScan. Panel C compares between the propensity-score-matched samples of CPP applicants whose applications were approved and unapproved. 
Panel A: Bank-level data 






CPP application indicator 0.798 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.402
CPP approval indicator (if applied) 0.791 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.407
CPP investment indicator (if approved) 0.845 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.362
CPP investment amount ($000) 144,000 14,700 30,100 817,000 406,000
Bank size
Total assets ($000) 327,433 66,744 145,076 340,285 462,369
Assets in financial securities ($000) 58,874 9,049 23,728 61,355 88,426
Financial condition
Capital adequacy (%) 12.876 9.692 10.658 12.748 9.256
Asset quality (%) -1.889 -2.274 -0.927 -0.264 3.166
Earnings (%) 3.211 1.706 6.483 10.483 15.758
Liquidity (%) 3.993 2.231 3.028 4.207 4.217
Sensitivity to market risk (%) 14.681 5.382 11.029 19.865 12.534
Foreclosures (%) 0.397 0.033 0.148 0.411 1.086
Percentage of core deposit funding (%) 80.216 76.561 81.014 86.006 8.967
Exposure to regional economic 
shocks  (%) -0.032 -0.619 0.303 0.740 1.109
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Panel B: Loan-level data 






Application approval indicator 0.643 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.479
Loan to income ratio 2.000 0.851 1.778 2.778 1.515
Loan amount ($000) 179.1 59.0 123.0 238.0 165.9
Applicant income ($000 per year) 104.3 44.0 73.0 128.0 88.0
Corporate loan data
Loan amount ($000) 604,000 150,000 300,000 700,000 941,000
Panel C: Matched Samples 
Variable Unapproved Approved Difference t-statistic
Capital adequacy (%) 11.548 12.013 0.464 0.754
Asset quality (%) -0.052 -0.054 -0.003 0.131
Earnings (%) -0.921 -0.822 0.099 0.247
Liquidity (%) 4.061 3.783 -0.279 0.446
Sensitivity to market risk (%) 11.508 9.969 -1.540 1.104
Foreclosures (%) 0.315 0.304 -0.012 0.364
Size (log assets) 13.922 13.402 -0.520 1.491
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Table II
Mortgage Application Approval Rates and Loan Risk 
This table reports regression estimates from a linear probability model explaining the relation between a bank’s approval for CPP funds and a
bank’s mortgage origination decisions across borrowers of different risk. The dependent variable is an indicator that equals one if a loan was 
approved and zero if it was denied. After CPP is an indicator that equals one in 2009-2010 and zero in 2006-2008. Approved bank is 
instrumented as the predicted likelihood that a bank is approved for CPP funds, conditional on applying, from a regression of CPP approvals on 
a bank’s geography-based representation on the House Financial Services Committee (please see Appendix C for details), except in Columns 
(3) and (6), where it is an indicator that equals one if a bank applied for CPP funds and was approved, and zero if it applied but was not 
approved. In all columns, except for Columns (2) and (4), the sample includes all publicly traded CPP applicants with a known application 
status, excluding the firms subject to stress tests. In Columns (2) and (4), the sample includes all publicly traded CPP-eligible firms, excluding 
the firms subject to stress tests. The variables After CPP and Approved bank drop out of the regression due to the inclusion of year and bank 
fixed effects, respectively. In the matched sample, for each bank that applied but was not approved for CPP, we match the closest approved 
bank based on propensity scores estimated from a regression that predicts the likelihood of CPP approval, using a bank’s Camels proxies,
foreclosures, and size. Loan-to-income ratio is the loan amount requested in a mortgage application divided by the applicant's annual income. 
Regulatory interventions is an indicator that equals one if, in a given year, a firm was subject to at least one disciplinary action from the four 
banking regulators. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The individual loan application data come from the Home Mortgage Disclosure 
Act (HMDA) Loan Application Registry and cover the period 2006-2010. All regressions include bank level controls, bank fixed effects, 
borrower fixed effects (gender, race, ethnicity), and tract fixed effects, which are not shown to conserve space. Bank level controls include the 
Camels proxies, foreclosures, fraction of core deposit funding, exposure to regional economic shocks, and size. The p-values (in brackets) are
based on standard errors that are heteroskedasticity consistent and clustered at the bank level. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient 
estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively.
Sample Full sample Matched sample
Model Baseline Including non-applicants No instrument Baseline
Including non-
applicants No instrument
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Loan to income -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.037*** -0.034***[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
After CPP x Approved bank -0.018 0.016 -0.052 -0.021 -0.022 -0.017[0.655] [0.351] [0.396] [0.649] [0.605] [0.407]
After CPP x Loan to income -0.058 -0.006 0.002 -0.013 -0.025 -0.025[0.181] [0.669] [0.874] [0.265] [0.476] [0.306]
Approved bank x Loan to 
income
-0.014 -0.018 -0.014 -0.003 -0.017 -0.011
[0.398] [0.312] [0.296] [0.749] [0.144] [0.494]
After CPP x Approved bank x 
Loan to income
0.080*** 0.073* 0.070*** 0.063*** 0.059* 0.064***
[0.007] [0.062] [0.005] [0.003] [0.088] [0.005]
Regulatory interventions -0.012** -0.008** -0.004 -0.013** -0.044 -0.023*[0.041] [0.032] [0.841] [0.039] [0.361] [0.055]
Regulatory interventions x 
Loan to income
-0.013** -0.014** -0.014** -0.005* -0.019* -0.018*
[0.038] [0.045] [0.027] [0.063] [0.057] [0.096]
Bank level controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tract fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 686,106 895,132 686,106 115,176 132,119 115,176

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Additional Evidence on Loan Originations and Loan Performance 
This table presents additional evidence on loan originations and loan performance for various subsets of CPP applicants. Columns (1) and (2) 
compare mortgage origination and risk taking at CPP-approved banks that accepted the funds (the indicator variable Approved bank equals one) and 
CPP-approved banks that declined the funds (the indicator Approved bank equals zero). The dependent variable in these columns is an indicator that 
equals one if a loan was approved and zero if it was denied. The full sample in these columns comprises all CPP-approved banks, except for firms 
subject to stress tests under the Capital Assessment Plan. Columns (3) and (4) compare credit origination and risk taking at CPP-approved banks that 
repaid the funds in 2009 and banks that applied for CPP but were not approved. The dependent variable in these columns is an indicator that equals 
one if a loan was approved and zero if it was denied. The full sample in these columns comprises approved banks that repaid CPP funds in 2009 and 
banks whose CPP applications were not approved, excluding firms subject to stress tests under the Capital Assessment Plan. Columns (5) and (6) 
compare loan charge-offs between banks whose CPP applications were approved and banks whose CPP applications were denied. The dependent 
variable in Columns (5) and (6) is net loan charge-offs expressed as a fraction of total loans. In these columns, each observation is a bank-quarter, 
and the full sample comprises all publicly-traded CPP applicants with a known application status, excluding firms subject to stress tests under the 
Capital Assessment Plan. In these columns, Approved bank is instrumented as the predicted likelihood that a bank is approved for CPP funds, 
conditional on applying, from a regression of CPP approval on a bank’s geography-based representation on the House Financial Services Committee. 
Across all columns, the variable After CPP is an indicator that equals one in 2009-2010 and zero in 2006-2008. Matched samples are constructed as 
follows. In Column (2), for each bank that was approved for CPP but declined funding, we find the closest approved bank that received funding 
based on propensity scores estimated from an OLS regression that explains the decision of approved banks to decline CPP funding using the Camels 
proxies, foreclosures, and size. In Columns (4) and (6), matched samples are constructed from the respective full sample based on the one-to-one 
matching procedure of the control and treatment groups according to the propensity score for CPP approval. The variables After CPP and Approved 
bank drop out of the regression due to the inclusion of year and bank fixed effects, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Bank level 
controls include the Camels proxies, foreclosures, percentage of core deposit funding, exposure to regional economic shocks, and size. Borrower 
fixed effects include gender, race, and ethnicity indicators. The p-values (in brackets) are based on standard errors that are heteroskedasticity 
consistent and clustered at the bank level. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
Test Approved CPP banks that accepted vs. declined funds
Banks that repaid CPP 
funds in 2009 Evidence on loan chargeoffs





Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Loan to income -0.028*** -0.023*** -0.034*** -0.065**[0.001] [0.000] [0.002] [0.019]
After CPP x Approved bank -0.035 -0.028 -0.015 -0.007 0.664*** 0.496*[0.628] [0.702] [0.758] [0.499] [0.003] [0.088]
After CPP x Loan to income -0.009 -0.004 -0.011 -0.010[0.362] [0.416] [0.291] [0.165]
Approved bank x Loan to income -0.028 -0.026* -0.012 -0.019[0.206] [0.071] [0.486] [0.374]
After CPP x Approved bank x Loan to 
income
0.015 0.013 0.056* 0.051*
[0.299] [0.326] [0.073] [0.093]
Regulatory interventions -0.024** -0.021** -0.006* -0.003[0.038] [0.046] [0.068] [0.512]
Regulatory interventions x Loan to 
income
0.017 0.009 -0.021 -0.024**
[0.537] [0.302] [0.693] [0.037]
Bank level controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borrower fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A
Year fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tract fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A
Observations 572,617 58,565 138,114 75,552 7,946 3,323














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Corporate Loans, Loan Commitments, and Loan Yields
This table provides evidence on the relation between a bank’s approval for CPP and its corporate lending, loan commitments, and 
loan yields. Panel A reports regression estimates from loan-level data explaining the relation between a bank’s approval for CPP and 
corporate lending. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the ratio of the number of lenders that were approved for CPP to the total 
number of lenders per syndicated loan. Data on corporate loans are obtained from Dealscan and cover the period 2006-2010. In Panel 
A, we use three measures of borrowers’ risk. Cash flow volatility is the volatility of earnings, net of taxes and interest and scaled by 
total assets, over the previous ten years. Intangible assets is the ratio of intangible assets to total book assets. Interest coverage is the 
inverse of the interest coverage ratio, calculated as interest expense divided by earnings before interest and taxes. Panel B reports 
regression estimates from panel regressions explaining bank loan commitments and yields on loan portfolios. In Columns (1) and (2) 
of Panel B, the dependent variable is Yield on loan portfolios, measured as interest and fee income from loans and leases divided by 
total loans and leases. In Columns (3) and (4) of Panel B, the dependent variable is loan commitments scaled by total assets. The
quarterly data are from the Call Reports for 2006-2010. Bank level controls comprise the Camels variables, foreclosures, percentage 
of core deposit funding, exposure to regional economic shocks, regulatory interventions, and size. Approved bank is instrumented as 
the predicted likelihood that a bank is approved for CPP funds, conditional on applying, from a regression of CPP approvals on a 
bank’s geography-based representation on the House Financial Services Committee. In the matched sample, each bank that applied 
for CPP but was not approved is matched to the closest approved bank based on propensity scores obtained from a regression that 
estimates the likelihood of CPP approval. After CPP is an indicator that equals one in 2009-2010 and zero in 2006-2008. The 
variables After CPP and Approved bank drop out of the regression due to the inclusion of year and bank fixed effects, respectively. 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. The p-values (in brackets) are based on standard errors that are heteroskedasticity consistent 
and clustered at the borrower level. ***, **, or * indicates that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Corporate Loans 
Risk measure Cash flow volatility Intangible assets Interest coverage





Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Borrower risk -0.085** -0.013 -0.015 -0.038 -0.001 -0.027
[0.019] [0.833] [0.690] [0.607] [0.932] [0.142]
After CPP x 
Borrower risk
0.132** 0.056** 0.047** 0.036* 0.038** 0.040
[0.033] [0.029] [0.049] [0.068] [0.048] [0.594]
Bank fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,786 147 1,786 147 1,786 147
R-Squared 0.619 0.850 0.622 0.857 0.627 0.854
Panel B: Loan Commitments and Loan Yields 
Dependent variable Yield on loan portfolios Loan commitments
Sample Full sample Matched sample Full sample
Matched 
sample
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
After CPP x 
Approved bank
0.012* 0.014** 0.018 -0.023
[0.078] [0.037] [0.502] [0.633]
Bank level controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,946 3,323 7,946 3,323














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Overall Bank Risk 
This table reports regression evidence on the relation between CPP approvals and bank risk. Bank quarterly data are obtained from Call 
Reports and cover the period 2006-2010. After CPP is an indicator that equals one in 2009-2010 and zero in 2006-2008. The two main rows 
in the table correspond to different definitions of the variable Approved bank. In the first row, Approved bank is instrumented as the predicted 
likelihood that a bank is approved for CPP funds, conditional on applying, from a regression of CPP approvals on a bank’s geography-based 
representation on the House Financial Services Committee. In the second row, Approved bank is an indicator that equals one if the applicant 
bank was approved for CPP and zero if it was denied. The variables After CPP and Approved bank drop out of the regression due to the 
inclusion of year and bank fixed effects, respectively. In the matched sample, each bank that applied for CPP but was not approved is 
matched to the closest approved bank based on propensity scores obtained from a regression estimating the likelihood of CPP approval. ROA 
volatility is calculated as the quarterly standard deviation of ROA over the trailing four quarters. Z-score is the sum of the return on assets 
(ROA) and the equity capital ratio divided by the standard deviation of ROA. Betas are calculated based on the market model (with the CRSP 
value-weighted index as the market proxy), using daily returns over a one-year horizon. Stock return volatility is calculated from daily returns 
over a one-year horizon. All regressions include Bank level controls, which comprise the Camels variables, foreclosures, percentage of core 
deposit funding, exposure to regional economic shocks, regulatory interventions, and size. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The p-
values (in brackets) are based on standard errors that are heteroskedasticity consistent and clustered at the bank level. ***, **, or * indicates 
that the coefficient estimate is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level, respectively. 
Risk Measure ROA volatility Z-Score Beta Stock return volatility







Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
After CPP x Approved 
bank (instrument)
0.007*** 0.008*** -14.087*** -11.436*** 0.119** 0.048** 0.024*** 0.018***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.005] [0.000] [0.041] [0.046] [0.000] [0.001]
After CPP x Approved 
bank (indicator)
0.005*** 0.004** -10.392*** -8.596*** 0.114** 0.012** 0.016** 0.008*
[0.009] [0.023] [0.002] [0.006] [0.038] [0.039] [0.032] [0.089]
Bank level controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank fixed effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,946 3,323 7,946 3,323 7,946 3,323 7,946 3,323
71
